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Which past is prolog? the future of 
private antitrust enforcement
'  ' . -  ■ ■ q  ■ 
BY JOHN J. FLYNN* ~
I. Introduction
■ z
For the past four decades, and despite doubts voiced 100 years 
ago by the principal draftsmen of the Sherman Act,1 the primary 
enforcement of the federal antitrust laws has occurred through 
private litigation.2 Many of the leading cases carving out new
• Hugh B. Brown Professor of Law, College of Law, The Univer­
sity of Utah, Salt Lake City.
1 Klingsburg, Balancing the Benefits and Detriments o f Private 
Antitrust Enforcement: Detrebling Antitrust Injury, Standing and Other 
Proposed Solutions, 9 C ardozo L. R ev . 1215 (1988) (summarizing 
remarks of Senators Sherman and George expressing doubts about the 
ability of private plaintiffs to surmount the financial and legal obstacles 
to maintaining private suits).
2 Salop & White, Private Antitrust Litigation: An Introduction 
and Framework, in P rivate A ntitrust L itigation: N ew  E vidence, N ew 
L earning  3-4 (L . White, ed. 1988). Private suits have outnumbered 
public enforcement from a ratio of 6 to 1 to a ratio of 20 to 1 over the
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standards of antitrust legality and illegality are ones £hat have 
resulted from private litigation. There is no doubt that the 
attraction of treble damages and attorneys' fees have provided a 
major incentive for the great increase in private antitrust actions 
over the past four decades. A generally receptive Supreme Court 
in the 1960’s to the early 1970’s gave considerable encouragement 
and the means to the bar to specialize in the bringing of antitrust 
suits through the expansion of favorable judge-made doctrine 
and procedures facilitating private enforcement.
Thereafter, judicial hostility to private antitrust enforcement 
began a noticeable rise. In the late 1970's and the 1980’s, that 
hostility was manifested in the development of technical barriers 
to maintaining suits by doctrines such as “standing" and the 
intraenterprise conspiracy rule; by the increased use of summary 
judgment at a preliminary stage in private antitrust cases; and, by 
the shift in judicial and enforcement attitudes in favor of the 
legality of vertical market restraints. By the late 1980’s, changes 
in several doctrines and the shift in attitudes in the enforcement 
agencies have led to outright proposals to abolish or severely limit 
private antitrust enforcement, while court-imposed barriers to 
private suits continued t<j> mount. The trend has been running 
against private enforcement of antitrust policy, raising the possi­
bility that the second century of antitrust enforcement might see 
the demise, in practice if not in the express repeal, of private 
enforcement or the creation of a hiatus in private actions much 
like that which prevailed from the 1920’s through the 1940’s. If 
the past is prolog, which past is the prolog to the future of private 
antitrust enforcement—the relative absence of private antitrust 
enforcement in the first six decades or the activism of the last 
four decades of antitrust law?
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period measured. While many private suits were actions following 
federal enforcement, the sheer, number of private suits has consistently 
exceeded those filed by the federal government. The added deterrence of 
disgorging treble damages has added significantly to the deterrent effect 
of the antitrust laws through reliance upon rational self-interest to 
protect one's own interest without the necessity of direct government 
intervention.
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Predicting the future of private antitrust, let alone the future 
of the economy or who will win the World Series next year, is a 
matter of weighing several variables—some known, and many 
more, not known. The task puts one in mind of the late Arthur 
Leff’s reformulation of the economist's special theory of the 
second best into a general theory of the second best: “If a state of 
affairs is the product of n variables, and you have knowledge of, 
or control over less than n variables, if you think you know what 
is going to happen when you vary ‘your’ variables, you're a 
booby."1 To minimize the risk of violating Leffs general theory 
of the second best, this article reviews some of the key variables 
relevant to determining the future of private antitrust 
enforcement—passive or active, after listing variables one simply 
cannot make predictions about at this point in time.
II. Unknown variables
A . The ideology o f enforcement officials and judges
One set of unknown variables of central significance to a 
prediction of the future of antitrust generally, is the approach to 
antitrust policy by the appointments President Bush will make to 
the enforcement agencies and the courts. It is not difficult to 
imagine that the appointment of moderates and realists to the 
enforcement agencies and the courts will have a significant 
impact on antitrust enforcement. Following 8 years of what many 
have seen as Reagan administration nonenforcement of the anti­
trust laws* and the appointment of judges with strong-minded, if
3 Leff, Economic Analysis o f Law: Some Realism About Nominal­
ism, 60 Va . L. Rev. 451 (1974).
4 See, e.g., Adams & Brock, Reaganomics and the Transmogrifica­
tion o f Merger Policy, 33 A ntitrust Bull. 309 (1988); Krattenmaker & 
Pitofsky, Antitrust Merger Polity and the Reagan Administration, 33 
A ntitrust Bull. 211 (1988); Litvak, The Appropriate Enforcement 
Role o f the Government Antitrust Agency, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 1291
(1988); Pitofsky, Does Antitrust Have a Future? 76 Geo. L.J. 321
(1987); Shennefield, Open Letter to the New President o f the United 
States, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 1295 (1988).
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not rigidly ideological, beliefs in the wisdom of a policy of 
extreme laissez faire, the appointment of experienced lawyers 
rather than theorists to the agencies and courts can have a 
profound effect on antitrust enforcement. If that were to occur, 
perhaps we will see the end to enforcement guidelines issued for 
advocating judicial nonenforcement of the laws Congress passed 
or for legislating the views of enforcement officials of what the 
law ought to be rather than leaving to Congress the primary law­
making power. Government intervention in private litigation to 
prevent private enforcement might also subside. Court decisions 
dealing with the reality of cases and the practical procedural 
problems of litigation might even become the norm. We might 
even see the Justice Department stop trying to inflate its enforce­
ment statistics by bringing the same case over and over in each 
federal district court in the Union! There are, after all, only so 
many road builders one can charge with bid rigging and soft 
drink bottlers one can charge with price fixing. And, judges 
might begin to analyze the reality of cases in light of the values 
underlying the law instead of deductively applying the conclu­
sions of a theoretical model in light of its unrealistic assumptions 
to a reality not before the court.
There are a few aspects of the Reagan administration policies 
one can applaud and hope the Bush administration will continue. 
For example, the increased emphasis upon criminal sanctions for 
hard-core antitrust violations and support for a significant 
increase in criminal fines3 should continue to be a major emphasis 
of the Bush administration's antitrust policy. The continuation of 
the Carter administration's more stringent examination of the 
regulated industries has also produced worthwhile results by 
questioning the on-going need for regulation in rapidly changing 
areas of the economy. Beyond that however, it is difficult to 
identify positive benefits of 8 years of Reaganomics on antitrust 
policy, let alone the economy generally, unless one simply 
assumes that nonaction, a decline in staff morale at the enforce­
ment agencies, and the shrinking of enforcement budgets are, 
ipso facto, benefits.
5 See Starling, Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, 57 A ntitrust L. J.
157 (1988).
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B. The use and misuse o f enforcement guidelines
One unpredictable variable of public enforcement in need of 
review by both Congress and the new administration is the 
expanded use made of enforcement *'‘guidelines."6 Many com­
mentators are troubled by the expansive use of enforcement 
guidelines by the Antitrust Division beyond the merger area. The 
practice of an executive branch law enforcement agency issuing 
guidelines stating what the policy should be on a law adopted by 
Congress and committed to the courts for interpretation is incon­
sistent with the functions of a law enforcement agency, the 
Congress and the courts. While the FTC does have rule-making 
power subject to appropriate administrative law constraints, the 
Justice Department should confine its rule making to the only 
area where Congress has conferred a similar type of administra­
tive authority—the administration of merger policy as a result of 
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.7 Even in that instance, a serious 
reexamination of the practice should be undertaken since the 
Antitrust Division engages in a wide range of informal law 
making when issuing *'‘guidelines" and negotiating settlements 
with Hart-Scott-Rodino applicants without sufficient legal con­
straints upon the process or independent review of the standards 
adopted or the procedures followed.
The Merger Guidelines of both the FTC and the Antitrust 
Division also should be reviewed in the name of complying with 
the law Congress enacted*—rather than some law the agency
« For an interesting review of the use of enforcement guidelines in 
the merger, area and the conversion of the Antitrust Division from a law 
enforcement agency to an administrative one, see, Sullivan, The Anti­
trust Division as a Regulatory Agency: An Enforcement Policy in 
Transition, 64 Wash. U.L.Q. 997 (1986).
f 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
8 The underlying assumption of the Guidelines is to judge mergers 
by static neoclassical price theory rather than the dynamic structural 
standard implied by an incipiency standard and the legislative history of 
the Act. In effect, the Guidelines apply pre-1950 Sherman Act standards 
(1920’s Sherman Act standards) to mergers. A major goal of the 1950’s 
amendment was, of course, to overturn the application of Sherman Act
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believes Congress should have enacted. If there is a problem with
that law, appropriate legislation should be presented to Congress
for its consideration9—a process mandated by the Constitution
despite claims made for unilateral law-making powers implicit in
some of the other executive branch practices of the Reagan
administration. At a very minimum, considerable thought should
be given to lowering the level of the Herfindahl index triggering
merger challenges by the enforcement agencies. At a minimum,
consideration should be given to enforcing the standards
adopted, rather than an undisclosed set of standards adopted for
in-house use.10 Actions should be brought or inaction should be
thoroughly explained where the agency's own standard for when
a merger should be challenged is violated by a particular merger.
Other “guidelines" issued by the Antitrust Division do not 
appear to be for providing guidance—but are for advocacy. 
There are few who believe that the Antitrust Division's Vertical 
Guidelines were intended to be a fair summary of what the law is 
on vertical restraints, let alone what Congress intends the 
enforcement agencies should do about vertical restraints.11 The
standards to mergers. See, Schwartz, The New Merger Guidelines: 
Guide to Governmental Discretion and Private Counselling or Propa­
ganda for Revision of the Antitrust Laws, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 575, 576 
(1983): “[U]nder the guise of regularizing discretion, the antitrust laws 
are being amended without benefit of congressional action.”
9 See, The Merger Modernization Act, H.R. 4247, 99th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1986), the Reagan administration’s proposal for a change in the 
Clayton Act § 7 standards to require that a merger's effect “will be” to 
increase the ability of one or more firms profitably to maintain prices 
above a competitive level for a significant period of time. The proposal 
would abandon the incipiency standard of the present law and rely 
solely on neoclassical price theory to determine the legality of a 
merger—a policy course it would appear the 1984 Guidelines and the 
current administration of them is adopting in fact if not in law. It is a 
policy course Congress neveiyidopted.
10 See Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall o f Efficiency as the Ruler 
of Antitrust, 33 A ntitrust Bull. 429, 453 (1988).
11 See, Note, The 1980's Amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act 
and the Revitalized Per Se Illegality of Resale Price Maintenance, 9 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1435 (1988).
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Vertical “Guidelines" are an advocate's brief for a particular 
belief of what the law ought to be rather than what Congress 
intends. As such, they should be withdrawn by the Bush adminis­
tration.12 Similar claims are made about the Guidelines for Inter­
national Operations and those too should be withdrawn since 
they read like draft judicial opinions instead of a fair summary of 
what the courts have decided the law is.13 Antitrust Division 
authorities should be limited to advocating their beliefs through 
briefs in government cases in court where they can be challenged 
before an impartial judge and in independently refereed law 
review articles, unless we are willing to give the agency law­
making powers heretofore left to the judiciary or Congress and
law review footnote checkers. ..
t
C. Judicial appointments
Another unknown variable of great significance to the future 
of private antitrust enforcement concerns what types of judicial 
appointments the new administration will make. Judicial appoint­
ments are, of course, crucial to the future evolution of antitrust 
policy. Congress has entrusted wide discretion to the courts 
in defining the direction and meaning of antitrust policy. While 
the Warren Court era judges may have gone too far in their 
concern for populist values in cases like Von’s Grocery14 and
12 The vertical restraint guidelines and the international operations 
guidelines are "nothing more than a large amicus brief" and should be 
withdrawn. 55 A ntitrust & T rade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 799 (Nov. 3, 1988) 
(Remarks of T. Kauper).
13 For a contrary view, see Hawk, The Proposed Revisions of the 
Justice Department's Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations 
and Recent Developments in EEC Competition Law, 57 A ntitrust L.J. 
299(1988).
14 United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). The 
problem with the Court's opinion is not necessarily the result, but the 
way the Court got there. The Court's opinion is primarily a factual one 
without establishing predictable standards by which a merger ought or
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Schwinn,'9 it appears that the Burger and Rehnquist era of 
judicial activism is going too far in the direction of embracing a 
simplistic static version of neoclassical economic ideology without 
regard for reality or the goals of antitrust policy in cases like 
Matsushita16 and Business Electronics v. Sharp." The direction 
taken by the Bush administration in its judicial appointments and 
congressional reaction to them will have a great influence over the 
next decade in determining whether antitrust policy will remain a 
significant element in determining economic policy and the rights 
of consumers and competitors or whether it will become a curious 
backwater largely of historical interest like it was in the 1920's; of 
little interest until the next economic disaster such as the Great 
Depression of the 1930's undermines the economy.
ought not to be judged pro- or anticompetitive. The subsequent adop­
tion of premerger notification and the examination of a proposed
merger by the enforcement agencies prior to its consummation, may
have mitigated the dilemma of the courts in establishing workable
guidelines for judging the legality of mergers under the broad incipiency 
standards of die Clayton Act by limiting the number of litigated cases.
But it has not eliminated the problem of adopting and making known 
workable standards implementing the policies of Congress—it has 
simply shifted it to those administering premerger notification.
15 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) 
(drawing the line between lawful and unlawful dealer restrictions on 
resale between consignment and sales transactions on the basis of the 
common law doctrine of restraints on alienation; a knowable and 
predictable rule, but one easily circumvented and one that failed to 
grapple with all of the normative goals underlying the doctrine of 
restraints on alienation and the purposes of antitrust policy). See Flynn, 
The Function and Dysfunction of Per Se Rules in Vertical Market 
Restraints, 58 Wash. U.L.Q. 767 (1980).
16 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574 (1986). See Flynn, An Antitrust Allegory, 38 Hastings 
L.J. 517 (1987).
17 Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 108 S. Ct. 
1515 (1988). Seet Flynn, The “Is” and “Ought” of Vertical Restraints 
After Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 71 Cornell L. Rev. 
1095, 1114 (1986) (criticizing the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Business 
Electronics subsequently followed by the Supreme Court).
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A key to the reflective development of antitrust policy 
through new appointments to the courts is that the Senate exert 
responsibly its coequal authority in the appointment of judges. 
Serious Senate evaluation will insure that we have judges who are 
reflective about the values they hold; open minded to challenges 
to those values and contrary statements of values; aware of the 
reality and facts of cases they must decide; skillful in the use of 
legal reasoning rather than the. manipulation of definitions and 
deductive logic; experienced in the practical problems of litiga­
tion; and, sensitive to the congressionally mandated values under­
lying the laws they must enforce instead of the implementation of 
their own closed-minded and ideological beliefs."
•  ^t
D. Overcoming barriers to entry in the private antitrust 
litigation market
Another unpredictable variable affecting the future of private 
antitrust enforcement concerns the willingness of the private bar 
and their clients to invest the resources necessary to bring credible 
private antitrust cases. From my conversations with members of 
both the plaintiffs' and defendants' bars around the country, it is 
apparent that many are cautiously gearing up for an increased 
level of federal antitrust enforcement—particularly in the merger 
area and in the area of horizontal restraints.
There is a growing chorus of concern about the merger 
movement claiming that it is driven primarily by promoters and 
deal makers interested in fees rather than the rational and 
efficient organization of the merging firms,19 That perception is 
gaming the upper hand in Congress, among the public and even 
on Wall Street. There is more and more academic writing suggest­
ing that the hypermerger movement is not in our national eco­
18 See Flynn, The Reagan Administration's Antitrust Policy, 
“Original Intent” and the Legislative History o f the Sherman Act, 33 
A ntitrust Bull. 259 (1988).
19 See Krattenmaker & Pitofsky, supra note 4; Adams & Brock, 
supra note 4.
nomic interest, creates a debt-heavy corporate America posing 
fundamental economic risks in the event of a recession, detracts 
from economic efficiency and capital investment by draining off 
capital to nonproductive ends, and creates unmanageable firms 
that soon find themselves spinning off parts of the acquired 
firm.20
Another explanation for the belief that merger enforcement 
will increase may be the result of the past 8 years of merger mania 
with little or no stringent section 7 enforcement.21 One wit 
commenting on the passing antitrust scene suggested that the 
relaxed triggering level of the Herfindahl index is reached in just 
about every merger that now takes place after 8 years of merger 
fever and the general nonenforcement of section 7. Art Buch- 
wald’s cynical column about the inconclusive debate in the 
Justice Department over whether to challenge the merger of the 
Sampson Securities Company owning the stock of all companies 
west of the Mississippi and the Delilah Corporation owning all 
companies east of it, attached as an appendix to Justice Douglas* 
concurring opinion in United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.,22 no 
longer seems so far-fetched.
Eight years of lax enforcement, sanctioned and encouraged by 
some judges, also may explain why there appears to be a likeli­
hood of an increase in both public and private enforcement in 
other areas of antitrust as well. The business community, like 
everyone exceeding the speed limit on the highway at 3:00 a.m. 
because no police are on the scene, can soon lose its fear of 
antitrust. Those subject to the law begin to engage in activities 
coming closer and closer to the line of illegality. For example, 
parties to a merger recently attempted to circumvent the ability of 
the FTC to have a court issue a preliminary injunction to stop the
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20 Seet W . Adams & J. Brock, The Bioness Complex (1986); D. 
Davenport & F . Scherer, M ergers, Sell-O ffs and Economic Effi­
ciency (1987); R. W ills, J. Casw ell & J. Culbertson, Issues A fte r  a  
Century of Fed eral Competition Policy (1987).
21 See Adams & Brock, supra note 4.
22 384 U.S. 546, 553-55 (1966).
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merger by moving up the date of acquisition after receiving notice 
the Commission intended to seek the injunction.23 It is an example 
of increased antitrust activity because of the Reagan era of low 
visibility enforcement policy encouraging high-risk conduct by 
those subject to the law. Such conduct is encouraged by the 
tendency of the last administration to seek a justification for 
whatever someone wished to do in terms of the neoclassical 
model—save horizontal price fixing—without asking whether the 
competitive process might be damaged on a long- or short-term 
basis, whether Other schools of economic and political thought 
ought to be heard from or even whether the reality of particular 
cases should be considered.
Perhaps the enforcement agencies have finally recognized the 
unduly permissive climate they have created. Startling things have 
begun to happen. The FTC staff has even filed a Robinson- 
Patman Act proceeding against major book publishers charging 
price discrimination in favor of large book store chains over their 
smaller competitors.2* Most antitrust practitioners have come to 
believe that mentioning the Robinson-Patman Act within the 
confines of the Federal Triangle was at least a misdemeanor; 
suggesting that a case be filed to enforce the Act was a felony.
E. Confused congressional antitrust attitudes
Adding to the possibility that there may be more vigorous and 
wide-ranging antitrust enforcement by the federal agencies gener­
ating additional private enforcement, is the prospect that Con­
gress will continue to exert pressure for such a course of conduct. 
It is doubtful that Senator Metzenbaum will be any more sympa­
thetic to moves to relax antitrust standards than he has been in 
the past. It is likely that Congressman Brooks, chairperson of the 
House Judiciary Committee, will be similarly inclined. One
23 FTC V. Elders Grain, Inc., 1989-1 Trade Cases 168,411 (7th Cir. 
1989).
24 In re Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., Dkt. Nos. 9317-9222 
(FTC Dec. 22, 1988).
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observer has classified Congressman Brooks as a cross between 
Congressman Celler and Congressman Rodino. Consequently, 1 
expect we will see continued pressure for more active merger 
enforcement, the aggressive investigation of a broader range of 
horizontal restraints, continued calls to pursue vertical price- 
fixing cases23 and concerns expressed about enforcement policy 
dealing with other questionable practices. For the Washington 
bar, there would appear to be plenty of Hill work ahead with the 
reintroduction of resale price maintenance legislation, moves to 
repeal the McCarran-Ferguson Act, battles over legislation modi­
fying Illinois Brick and proposed legislation designed to eliminate 
the presumption of economic power with regard to intellectual 
property.26
It must be noted however, that Congress has not been a 
bastion of proantitrust fervor. Despite a general proantitrust 
reputation, a PAC-dominated Congress has not managed in the 
past decade to enact an activist antitrust agenda by passing bills 
such as those designed to overturn the Illinois Brick decision or 
come to grips with standards to govern vertical restraints. 
Instead, it has enacted such questionable legislation as the One 
House Veto of agency rule making later invalidated by the 
Supreme Court;27 the reincarnation of the unused Webb- 
Pomerene Act; through export trade cartels under the Export 
Trading Act of 1982;28 legislation authorizing joint research
25 See, Brooks Offers Bill on Standards in Resale Price Mainte­
nance Suits, 56 A ntitrust & T rade Reg. Rep . (BNA) 363 (March 9, 
1989).
26 See, Few Surprises Expected as Congress Focuses on Competi­
tion, Deception Issues, 56 A ntitrust & T rade Reg. Rep . (BNA) 86 (Jan. 
19, 1989).
27 Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980), held unconstitutional in 
Consumer’s Union, Inc. v. F.T.C., 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd 
sub nom., Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council 
of America, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983). See also, I.N.S. v. Chada, 462 U.S. 
919 (1983).
2* 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001 et seq.
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ventures and limiting private treble damage actions with respect 
to them;29 legislation limiting treble damage remedies for peer 
review activities in the health care field;30 legislation sanctioning 
exclusive territories in the soft drink bottling business;31 and 
legislation eliminating damage actions, but not injunction 
actions, for anticompetitive activity by local governments.32 When 
all is said and done, Congress has shown itself remarkably 
responsive to special interest legislation chipping away at antitrust 
policy generally and treble damage actions in particular. The hard 
truth is that Congress* antitrust record has been more anti­
antitrust than proantitrust, making it another unpredictable vari­
able in predicting the future of private antitrust activity.
A significant anti-antitrust bp that has materialized in the 
101st Congress, is a move to permit production and commerciali­
zation joint ventures along lines similar to the immunity provided 
by the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 and the National 
Cooperative Research Act of 1984.33 Playing on concerns about 
foreign competition, it is argued that U.S. firms need immunity 
to form production and distribution cartels for the purposes of 
coordinating production and marketing activities in competition 
with foreign firms or cartels. Although the Attorney General and 
Secretary of Commerce have voiced early support for such a 
measure,34 the proposal has sparked widespread debate and oppo-
2» 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-05.
30 The Health Care Quality Improvements Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 11101, ef ££?.
31 Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3501-03.
32 Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36.
33 The Joint Manufacturing Opportunities Act of 1989, H.R. 423, 
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); National Cooperative Innovation and 
Commercialization Act of 1989, H.R. 1024, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989). See generally, Witnesses Declare That Antitrust Law Discour­
ages Formation of Joint Ventures, 56 A ntitrust & T rade Reg. Rep. 
(BNA) 319 (March 2, 1989).
34 56 A ntitrust & T rade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 9 (Jan. 5, 1989).
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sition from both the right and the left in academia. Hearings on 
the bill will find all the heavyweights of antitrust trooping to the 
Hill to debate what would be the most fundamental reorientation 
of antitrust policy since the NRA of the 1930's.
Giving rebirth to a form of the National Recovery Act of the 
1930’s” should provoke an interesting debate. Blaming America's 
competitive ills on the antitrust laws, after a sustained period of 
nonenforcement and the creation of significant judicial limita- 
> tions on private enforcement, is a bit disingenuous if not hypo­
critical. Doing so through unnecessary legislation permitting joint 
production and commercialization ventures cuts out the heart of 
antitrust policy—preserving a competitive process as the best way 
to allocate resources, control undue accumulations of private 
economic power, insure innovation and insure equality of access 
to the market. United States trade policy should be seeking ways 
to break open Japan's domestic market to foreign competition, 
rather than gradually eliminating competition in our own in a 
vain attempt to emulate Japan's culture and system. As James 
Fallows recently observed, if we must imitate Japan to best Japan 
in the marketplace we also must be prepared to do the following 
if we expect to see it work:
First, we rig politics so that one party is always in power and big-city 
votes don't count. Then we double the cost of everything else but 
hold incomes the same. Then we close the borders and start celebrat­
ing racial purity. Then we reduce the number of jobs for women by
70 to 80 percent. Then we set up a school system that teaches people 
not to ask questions. After a while, we can have a trade surplus too.36
In order to make such a system work like Japan's, we also must 
implement like Japan a system of economic and political feudal-
35 Held unconstitutional in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
36 Fallows, For Those Who Have a Yen for the Japanese Way: 
Think Twice, Washington Post (weekly ed. Feb. 20-26,1989), at 23,24. 
See also, Fallows, The Hard Life, The A tlantic Monthly, March 1989, 
at 16.
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ism, markets closed to foreign competition, and manufacturing 
and distribution cartels designed to raise domestic consumer 
prices about 70% higher than those prevailing in the United 
States.
The time has come for Congress to stop chipping away at 
antitrust policy piecemeal by flirting with each competitive 
crisis—real or imagined—as it comes along. We need another 
T.N.E.C. study or exhaustive and fundamental bearings of the 
type that the late Senator Philip Hart endured to establish 
whether America's competitive ills in the world economy are due 
to the failure to enforce antitrust policy in our domestic and 
foreign trade, rather than the existence of antitrust laws that are 
too rigid for our national economic survival in a more competi­
tive world economy. The price w^e pay in abandoning antitrust 
policy as the basic means for regulating our economy and 
relationships within it are of wide-ranging and long-term eco­
nomic, political and social dimensions.37 The present tendency of 
Congress to ad hoc antitrust policy to pieces, has left both the 
public's understanding and Congress' understanding of the 
broader social, political and economic purposes of competition 
policy confused and disorganized. It is time for Congress to go 
beyond the ad hoc and fad of the moment and take a much 
broader, deeper and long-term look at what our commitment to a 
competitive process means and what it ought to mean— 
politically, socially and economically for the immediate and long­
term future. The future of private antitrust enforcement will 
remain impossible to predict without a cl(*ar mandate for its 
continuation or its demise from Congress.
F . A rebirth o f state antitrust enforcement? :\
Another variable that is difficult to gauge concerns a little- 
noticed development in Washington, D.C. but not among law
37 For some idea of the implications see M. Sklar, T he Corporate 
Reconstruction of A merican Capitalism 1890-1916 (1988), a review of 
the economic, social and political issues involved in the process of 
institutionalizing antitrust policy at the turn of the last century.
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firms elsewhere in the country. It is the continued growth and 
increased vitality of state antitrust enforcement.” State antitrust 
enforcement has become institutionalized with committed 
bureaucracies in many states devoted to its expansion. State 
antitrust officials do not fear to tread where federal enforcement 
officials believe the law should not tread. For example, states are 
becoming more active in merger enforcement39 and favor more 
vigorous antitrust review of vertical restraints.40 Both California 
and New York have been active in merger enforcement and state 
attorneys general in other states are interested as the result of 
significant mergers in their states such as the recent merger 
between Utah Power & Light Company and Pacific Corp.41 
creating a large regional electric utility and significant antitrust 
and regulatory issues in a basic public service for the local 
economies of several states.
In the vertical restraints area, state enforcement officials 
remain the major enforcers of traditional antitrust policy. For 
example, the state antitrust offices of New York and Maryland 
recently settled resale price maintenance cases for $16 million 
against Panasonic.42 In addition, many states have been particu­
larly active in franchise regulation, either under state antitrust
38 A collection of recent significant articles reviewing state antitrust 
enforcement is reprinted in 28 J. Reprints for A ntitrust L. & E con. #2
(1989).
39 State attorneys general have found it necessary to become 
involved in the "guidelines” game in the merger field. See, National 
Association of Attorneys General Merger Guidelines, 50 A ntitrust & 
T rade Reg. Rep . 1306 (Spec. Supp.., March 12, 1987).
40 With respect to vertical restraints, the National Association of 
State Attorneys General has also issued a set of "guidelines” in 1985. 
See, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) J 50,478.
41 Re Utah Power & Light Co., 45 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n Rep. 
(CCH) J 61,095, 96 P.U.R.4th 325 (1988).
42 See, Panasonic Will Refund $16 Million to Settle New York, 
Maryland RPM Cases, 56 A ntitrust & T rade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 89 (Jan. 
19, 1989).
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and securities laws or under special state franchise statutes. In 
any current trade regulation index, state franchise cases consume 
pages of citations. In many instances, state franchise regulation is 
a response to the vacuum of sensible federal regulation of vertical 
market relationships under federal antitrust law. It should be 
noted also, that some of the state regulatory responses are 
anticompetitive and are not necessarily in the public interest. 
Rapidly multiplying state franchise regulations have been creating 
a confusing patchwork of regulation as well, which many 
national franchisors are finding increasingly difficult and expen­
sive to comply with. Anticompetitive and unnecessary state regu­
lations are a cost of the failure of federal enforcement officials to 
adopt a more realistic, flexible and less ideological approach to 
vertical restraints, leaving a vacuum where state and local offi­
cials are pressured to adopt regulatory approaches to fill in the 
gap; regulations that are not always in the public interest.
The consequences are that many law firms and courts around 
the country find themselves involved with a rapidly growing field 
of state antitrust enforcement—either states enforcing federal 
antitrust laws as consumers or in the enforcement of state 
antitrust and related laws in their own courts regulating vertical 
marketing and other practices. This is one of those variables one 
can predict will continue and that it probably will expand despite 
the recently announced effort of the FTC to adopt franchise rules 
designed to preempt state franchise regulation.43 It is also reason­
able to predict that such action by the FTC will be vigorously 
resisted and will be viewed as an attempt to get rid of significant 
state and federal regulation of the sale, enforcement and termina­
tion of franchises. It will not be viewed as the adoption of a 
responsible, effective and fair uniform federal standard to govern 
franchising and other vertical market abuses, but the further 
abandonment of federal responsibility to adopt a more realistic 
and pragmatic antitrust approach to vertical market restraints.
43 FTC's Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Amendment 
of Trade Regulation Rule Governing Franchises, 56 A n titrust & Trade  
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 307 (Feb. 23, 1989).
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G. The deregulation movement
Another difficult to gauge variable of significance to private 
antitrust enforcement is the continued evolution of deregulation 
of presently or previously regulated industries. As a general 
proposition, one might expect to see antitrust policy involved in 
both generating pressure to deregulate and in “regulating" indus­
tries after they are “deregulated." For example, the natural gas 
transmission industry is now going through the confusion of ad 
hoc deregulation—deregulation imposed by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission [FERC] converting pipelines from being 
brokers of natural gas to being common carriers of gas. It is a 
jurisdictionally questionable exercise of power by FERC44 and an 
area that Congress should be addressing through legislation. 
Deregulation of gas purchases and sales by pipelines is nonethe­
less underway and it is a process that is generating private treble 
damage litigation by sellers and buyers of gas and is likely to 
cause more private litigation in the future.43 Common carrier 
status for transmission pipelines and other developments in the 
industry are expected to lead to mergers in the industry—mergers 
likely to generate significant competitive questions about the 
activities of merged firms postmerger, and arrangements leading 
up to or entered into in conjunction with a particular merger.
In the electric power industry, FERC has begun to use its 
authority over mergers in the industry to impose common carrier 
obligations similar to those it is imposing in the gas transmission 
business on the merging parties where the merger has anticom­
petitive features. The leading case is Utah Power & Light Co.,46
44 See, e.g., Watkiss, Deregulatory Myopia: Sacrificing the Filed 
Rate Doctrine and Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking to Promote 
Competition in Gas Markets, 42 Sw. L.J. 711 (1988).
45 See, e.g., James River Corp. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., Civ. 
No. 87-1141 RE (D. Ore. 1987); State v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline 
Co., 852 F.2d 891 (7th Cir), cert, denied, 109 S. Ct. 543 (1988).
46 45 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 1 61,095 (Oct. 26,
1988)
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and the conditions imposed are already generating complex regu­
latory issues. The conditions also may spark antitrust disputes in 
the future because of the considerably more complex nature of 
the electric utility industry as compared with the natural gas 
industry.47 It is generally agreed in the industry that it is on the 
edge of a large number of mergers seeking to rationalize the 
transmission system and competing sources of power generation. 
Such mergers are likely to raise substantial competitive issues and 
cause significant private antitrust litigation before the dust finally 
settles and the industry is more sensibly structured both horizon­
tally and vertically. Once again, it is an area in urgent need of 
congressional action,48 rather than an ad hoc regulatory response 
by conditions placed on mergers that happen to come along.
Another regulated industry likely to breed significant private 
antitrust work is the telephone industry. The breakup of 
A.T. & T. is only part of the problem. The more significant and 
longer term problem, one where the Justice Department, the 
operating companies and Judge Greene have a considerable 
difference of opinion, concerns the question of the scope of 
businesses the divested Bell operating companies will be allowed 
to enter. State regulatory schemes also have a considerable 
interest in the matter. State action or nonaction in response to 
operating company moves into related businesses is the source of 
complex antitrust issues of interest to the private bar as well.
The seven Bell operating companies have total assets of $151 
billion plus and revenues of $69.7 billion in 1987; they are among 
the largest and most powerful entities in our society and hold 
monopoly control over a key segment to the future evolution of
47 See Russo, Transmission Access—A Crucial Issue for an Indus­
try, 123 P ub. Util. Fort. 18 (Feb. 16, 1988).
48 Among other things, Congress should consider adopting a law 
permitting private power companies access to low-cost public power if 
the private power companies agree to open up their transmission 
systems on a common carrier basis subject to FERC rate and service 
regulation. We can no longer afford the wasteful and environmentally 
harmful duplication of generation and transmission resources caused by 
the long-standing war between public and private power.
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communication  ^technology and policy in our society. They are 
seeking the end to restrictions in the A.T. & T. consent decree 
limiting the kinds of related businesses they may engage in, 
including the manufacture of telephone equipment, the providing 
of long distance service and the providing of information serv­
ices, including cable TV and enhanced computer services. Judge 
Greene is resisting on the ground that the operating companies 
still have a bottleneck monopoly over switching and the local 
loop and that permitting the operating companies to engage in 
related lines of business will only be inviting the anticompetitive 
abuses that required the breakup of A.T. & T. in the first place. 
Former Assistant Attorney General Rule to the contrary notwith­
standing/9 Judge Greene obviously has the better of the debate. 
Moreover, the advent of fiber optic cable on the local loop is 
likely to strengthen and expand the bottleneck monopoly over 
switching and the local loop by taking over such fields as the 
delivery of cable television and computer services to the home. 
Many of the operating companies are also seeking the relaxation 
or abolition of local rate regulation under the banner of *‘incen­
tive" or “revenue sharing" rate regulation; the conferring of
Rule, Antitrust and Bottleneck Monopolies, 5 Telematics 16 
(Dec. 1988). Former Assistant Attorney General Rule's basic objection 
is that antitrust courts are not capable of regulating pricing decisions by 
the bottleneck monopolist and that economic theory (based on unrealis­
tic factual and normative assumptions) dictates that it is in the bottle­
neck monopolist's best interest to insure maximum use of the bottleneck 
at the lowest possible cost. Consequently, it is assumed that even where 
the bottleneck monopolist drives out competitors in related markets the 
consumer wiU be better off since there is no way to determine whether 
they will be worse off. Like other policy pronouncements of Mr. Rule, 
this one appears to be the product of abstract economic theorizing 
detached from reality and inconsistent with the congressionally man­
dated goals of antitrust policy. See, Flynn, supra note 18. The implica­
tion of Rule's analysis that bottleneck monopolies create no antitrust 
problems because the theoretical conclusions of a model deductively 
derived from its unrealistic assumptions says so, implies that the original 
A.T. & T. should be put back together again. Several of the operating 
companies seem to be bent upon that path with respect to their own 
operations and apparently with the academic support of former Assis­
tant Attorney General Rule.
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monopoly pricing discretion on the operating companies that will 
leave only antitrust policy as a control over the potential abuse of 
the otherwise unchecked bottleneck monopoly power and profits 
conferred.
These developments generate a classic circumstance inviting 
private antitrust actions if deregulation at the state or federal 
level comes to pass. There are already some possible suits in the 
wind as the result of attempts by the operating companies to 
obtain greater pricing discretion over local rates and permissibh 
to enter related businesses. One type of suit illustrating the 
connection between bottleneck pricing discretion and entry into 
related business activity is private antitrust litigation challenging 
the use of negative options for inside wiring.50 Many local phone 
companies sent consumers a notice that their phone company 
would take care of any inside wiring problems they might have 
unless the consumer sent in a notice to the contrary. A monthly 
charge was to be assessed to all those not opting out of the so- 
called contract.31 Using monopoly power over captured customers 
and potentially deceptive sales practices to entrap customers for a 
service they probably need once in a couple of generations is not 
an enhancement of consumer welfare.
Another deregulated industry ripe for antitrust concern is the 
airline business. The Department of Transportation has permitted 
a large number of mergers in the industry to go through— 
Herfindahl notwithstanding—without significant challenge. The 
results have been predictable and probably would not have 
happened if the initial review of mergers in the industry had been 
committed even to the Reagan antitrust enforcement agencies
50 See, Sollenbarger v. Mountain States Telephone Co., 121 F.R.D. 
417 (D.N.M. 1988).
This information is based upon a study of documents released by 
the FCC pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request addressed 
to the Commission by the author. See, In re John Flynn, FOI Cont. No. 
88-188 (FCC, March 10, 1989).
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upon the phasing out of regulation rather than to the Department 
of Transportation.52
As a result of mergers taking place after deregulation, TWA 
has 83% of the market at St. Louis and fares have gone up 22% 
in the past 3 years; Delta has 77% of the Salt Lake hub and fares 
have gone up 26% in that market over the past 3 years; and, in 
Detroit, Northwest has 62% of the market and fares have gone 
up 27% in that market. During the same time period, the airline 
component of the consumer price index has gone up 11.1%. A 
private survey of 18 hubs where one carrier controls more than 
50% of the market found that in 15 of those hubs consumers pay 
significantly higher fares than the industry norm.33 It would 
appear that there is strong evidence of monopoly pricing going 
on—activity the Antitrust Division should be—but appears not to 
be—deeply concerned about, apparently in the belief that sup­
posed perfect competition coupled with supposed free entry will 
take care of a supposed problem. Perhaps some imaginative 
private attorney can figure out an antitrust theory on behalf of an 
appropriate plaintiff for what appear to be monopoly over­
charges as the result of several mergers that should not have been 
allowed to take place in the first instance in an industry character­
ized by significant entry barriers in reservations systems, airport 
landing rights and airport gate restrictions.
Several other industries, such as health care and emerging 
high tech industries developing difficult to classify intangible 
intellectual property values, present unique challenges to both 
antitrust and regulatory schemes seeking to curb practices sug­
gesting abuses of economic power take place often in the industry
52 Under the Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act, 49 U.S.C. App. 
§§ 1551, et seq.y DOT authority over airUne mergers under the old Act 
ceased on January 1, 1989, thereby leaving them subject to regulation 
under the antitrust laws at the instance of the antitrust enforcement 
agencies and private parties.
f  I .
53 The highlights of several recent studies are summarized in Hamil­
ton, The Hubbub Over Airline Hubbing, Washington Post (national 
weekly ed., Feb. 13-19, 1989), at 21.
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in a manner inconsistent with the normative goals underlying 
antitrust policy. Such industries are, and are likely to continue to 
be, a fruitful source of private antitrust challenges. Like those 
industries now undergoing deregulation, these emerging areas of 
complex economic activity continue to generate significant pri­
vate antitrust litigation in both federal and state courts. As such, 
they are new frontiers challenging the imagination .and creativity 
of the legal process to deal constructively with the issues they 
raise in the context unique to the activity involved and compatible 
with the underlying social, economic and political values we hold 
in common.
How a mixed system of private and public health care shall be 
regulated where third-party payment governs economic incentives 
and deep ethical issues and government financing effect access 
and availability, remains an unpredictable variable in estimating 
the future role of private antitrust in health care. Private and 
public efforts to protect emerging new technologies in high 
technology industries not neatly fitting traditional patent and 
copyright protections, also raise unpredictable variables that hold 
unknown implications for the future vitality of private antitrust 
enforcement in significant areas of newly emerging technological 
activity.
III. Predictable variables
If the Bush administration continues along the antitrust path 
chartered by the Reagan administration, there are Several identifi­
able variables that must be changed if private antitrust enforce­
ment is to have a significant future as the most important form of 
antitrust enforcement and a check upon public nonenforcement 
of the laws Congress has adopted. These are variables that largely 
reflect a current judicial hostility to private antitrust enforce­
ment, despite section 4 of the Clayton Act vesting a cause of 
action in “any person who shall be injured in his business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."34
54 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
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A, "Standing”
The first predictable variable influencing the future of private 
antitrust enforcement concerns access to the courts for private 
parties seeking to enforce the rights the law has given them. Over 
the past several years a particularly strange and pernicious doc­
trine called "standing** has been growing like a noxious weed. It 
is a confused and confusing doctrine, like "proximate cause** in 
torts and “privity** in contracts, limiting access to the courts in 
many areas of law without revealing the underlying reasons for 
doing so. It is an offshoot of the doctrine of justiciability; a 
doctrine more than one writer has pointed out is a myth. It is a 
myth because a finding that a particular dispute is not justiciable i 
or that a party does not have "standing,** outside the case or 
controversy doctrine, is to say something about the meaning or 
scope of the underlying law without saying so.55 Masking or 
hiding what is being said about the underlying law behind a 
concept called "standing,** obscures the substance of what is said 
about the underlying law and greatly confuses what the law is, 
how it should be pleaded considering the facts in a particular case 
and at what point in the litigation process it is appropriate to deal 
with the underlying substantive issues involved. Like the old 
doctrine of “substantive due process,** standing doctrine allows 
courts to litigate the merits of disputes and the meaning of the 
law on abstract paper motions without saying so by pretending 
that a claimant lacks a right to bring the suit in the first instance.56
55 McCormack, The Justiciability Myth and the Concept o f Law,
14 Hastings Const. L.Q. 595 (1987). See also, Fletcher, The Structure 
o f Standing, 98 Y ale L.J. 221, 229 (1988): "The essence of a true 
standing question is the following: Does the plaintiff have a legal right 
to judicial enforcement of an asserted legal duty? This question should 
be seen as a question of substantive law, answerable by reference to the 
statutory or constitutional provision whose protection is invoked.**
56 The analytical methodology of many standing cases resembles 
that followed in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), the classic 
substantive due process case. The majority repeatedly denied it was 
making any value choice when it set the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
down beside the Due Process clause to see if the former "squared** with 
the latter. The methodology is similar to that followed by economic
Private antitrust : 903
Use of the myth called “standing" is particularly pernicious 
since it is invoiced at the preliminary stages of the dispute and 
involves a paper fiiinitrial on both the facts and law via motion 
practice without any of the constraints of a normal trial or a full 
record on which the court can make an informed judgment. 
Understanding the basis of the decision and its substantive 
implications for both the field of law involved and future disputes 
under that law is often impossible and contributes to further 
litigation to establish the boundaries of what is not being said. 
Moreover, the doctrine generates substantial confusion over the 
constitutionally mandated different roles of judge and jury in the 
litigation of a private suit—no matter what the field of law 
infected by the virus called “standing."
These realities are particularly apparent in the antitrust field, 
where standing holdings have served as a mask for hiding deci­
sions on causation issues, damkge issues and issues about the 
substantive meaning and scope of the law. Saying one thing while 
deciding another, is scarcely an informed and artful use of legal 
analysis and has generated considerable confusion over what one 
must allege and prove in the early stages of antitrust litigation to 
avoid being summarily dismissed from court.
Elsewhere, 1 have suggested that private antitrust litigation 
should adopt the following analytical framework to both escape 
the bog of standing and more clearly define the distinction 
between judge and jury functions in private antitrust litigation:
1. Is there a factual connection between the plaintiffs claimed injury
and the defendant? (an issue not often contested);
ideologues who measure the legality of a practice in a particular case by 
seeing if the deductively derived conclusions of the model square with 
the unrealistic assumptions of the model. Many standing cases also 
pretend not to be making a value judgment concerning the underlying 
law when they examine whether the plaintiff is the proper person to 
maintain the particular suit. How one can make that judgment without 
also making judgments concerning the scope of the protections offered 
by the underlying law, causation or damage issues and the normative 
values underlying these issues is difficult to discern.
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2. Do the policies of the law and its system of protection extend to the 
interest that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate; and if some protection is 
afforded, what standard of care does the legal system impose upon 
the defendant? (questions of law for the judge);
3. Was the standard of care breached by the defendant? (a question of 
fact for the jury); and
4. What are the damages? (questions of fact for the jury).37
Such a system of analysis delineates the line between judge 
and jury functions and avoids the substantive confusion over 
duty, causation and damage issues generated by the courts’ use of 
the shifting, changing and meaningless concept of antitrust stand­
ing. Confronting most “standing” issues as ones concerning the 
scope of the duties imposed by the antitrust laws, causation 
problems or damage questions, would also require that the 
factual, normative and legal basis for the decision be identified 
and confronted, that it be done at an appropriate time and place 
in the litigation, |hat it be done in light of the constitutional 
division of judge and jury functions and that it be done in light of 
all the congressionally defined goals for antitrust policy.3'
57 Flynn, Rethinking Sherman Act Section 1 Analysis: Three Pro­
posals for Reducing the Chaos, 49 A ntitrust L.J. 1593, 1610-11 (1980); 
Flynn, supra note 15; Flynn, supra note 17, at 1124; Flynn & Ponsoldt, 
Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints: The 
Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Resolution of 
Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1125 (1987).
58 Direct suits by shareholders, employees or suppliers of corpora­
tions injured by an antitrust violation, for example, should be treated as 
damage issues, not “standing” issues. Requiring the suit to be main­
tained by the corporation in most but not all cases avoids complex 
damage issues, the risk of multiple recoveries, prejudice to creditor 
rights and the undue consumption of court time by a multiplicity of 
lawsuits. While the end result of such an approach would often be 
similar to the end result in using “standing” doctrine, the process by 
which the determination would be made would differ significantly and 
the issue considered would be narrowed down to a damage issue and not» 
be confused with or become the vehicle for determinations on the scope
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The most recent antitrust. pure “standing" case in the 
Supreme Court is Associated General Contractors v. California 
State Council o f Carpenters” In that case the Court upheld the 
dismissal before trial of an antitrust complaint charging that” the 
defendant contractors had engaged in a conspiracy to cause third- 
party contractors to hire subcontractors not signatory to the 
collective bargaining contract between the plaintiff union and the 
defendant contractors. The Court held that the right to bring an 
antitrust treble damage action—so-called standing—was to be 
interpreted in light of common law limitations like foreseeability, 
proximate cause, privity, directness of injury, and certainty of 
damages and that the antitrust laws should not be held to extend 
a remedy to everyone injured* by every ripple of an antitrust 
violation. The Court then sought to structure a test for determin­
ing whether the plaintiff union was within the class of persons the 
antitrust laws were designed to protect by an examination of a 
complex of factors such as the directness of the injury alleged, 
whether the plaintiff was in the area of the economy claimed to 
be damaged by a breakdown of competitive conditions, whether 
the plaintiff was within an identifiable class of persons with an 
incentive to bring the action and whether damages were specula­
tive.
Issues of the substantive meaning of the law, causation and 
proof of damages are confusingly mixed by the Court's approach
of the duties imposed under the .antitrust laws without saying so. 
Treating the issue as a damage issue would also leave room for unusual 
cases where a right to maintain an action should be recognized and 
would permit a more understandable distinction to be drawn between 
the damage requirements for injunctive actions and damage actions. See 
Flynn, Rethinking the Sherman Act Section 1 Analysis, supra note 57, 
at 1593. i
»  459 U.S. 519 (1983). The decision in Atlantic Richfield v. USA 
Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990) might also be considered a 
standing decision. It is not a pure standing decision because the majority 
opinion, confused and confusing as it is, purported to be analyzing the 
case on the issue of what evidence is sufficient to prove “injury."
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in the name of standing, and one required to be decided before a 
full record of the claim is presented to the Court without clearly 
identifying which issue is being decided, at what point in the 
litigation it must be decided or how the recipe of factors to decide 
it should be blended. If the Court wished to hold section 1 of the 
Sherman Act should not apply to a vertically induced boycott in 
labor markets where a competitive process is distorted by private 
contract (a substantive ruling on the scope of the duties imposed 
by the antitrust laws in the circumstances), it should have said so 
rather than decide the substantive duty issue behind a fog of 
standing doctrine leaving ambiguous the basis of the decision. 
The opinion reads like a common law judge’s analysis of whether 
someone has stated a claim within the common law forms of 
action, rather than a lucid explication of the scope of the duties 
imposed on the defendant by the antitrust laws, the standards of 
proof for finding a breach of the duty, the factors necessary to\ 
prove the element of causation or the considerations underlying 
the issue of what damages are and are not recoverable.
The consequences are apparent. The opinion is a confused 
and’confusing mishmash further hampering the intelligent plead­
ing of a private treble damage action; our understanding of what 
violates the law and what does not; the meaning and scope of the 
constitutional right to jury trial in treble damage actions; what 
facts are relevant to the analysis of the issue and at what point in 
the trial they become relevant; and, the structuring of an orderly 
process for the motion stage and the trial stage of a private 
antitrust case. Apparently, in a certain class of cases where a 
conspiracy is claimed to deny a plaintiff access to a market 
governed by a competitive process, it will be necessary to hold a 
minitrial on the pleadings to determine whether the law is vio­
lated, whether the violation caused the plaintiff damage and 
whether a plaintiff has a right to recover for the damages claimed 
in the circumstances to satisfy something called standing.. If a 
plaintiff survives that process at the motion stage of the case, 
then the plaintiff can have a trial to determine whether the 
defendant has violated duties owed the plaintiff under the anti­
trust laws, whether that violation has caused the plaintiff injury
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and whether the injury claimed constitutes measurable damages 
ufader the antitrust laws. In philosophy, circular reasoning of this 
sort is called a tautology; in law it is called standing; and, in 
reality it should be called a form of unnecessary analytical 
chaos.80 0
The Court's opinion in Associated Contractors also relied 
upon the much debated and related rule of Illinois Brick 
denying recovery of damages by indirect purchasers. Illinois 
Brick, whatever its merits, was not a standing decision but. one 
that drew the line around the duties imposed on an antitrust 
defendant at liability to the first in the chain of distribution in the 
name of avoiding undue complexity in damage calculations and 
the risk to defendants of multiple liability beyond that permitted 
by the statute. Instead of seeking a less drastic remedy for these 
legitimate concerns in indirect purchaser cases like mandatory 
joinder of all claimants, the Court simply barred indirect pur­
chaser claims. Ever since the decision, confusion has reigned over 
issues like who are indirect purchasers and whether the concerns 
underlying Illinois Brick are present where overcharges caused by 
an antitrust violation are passed through to an indirect plaintiff 
down the line of distribution.
Two recent cases illustrate some of the confusion that now 
abounds:, In County o f Oakland v. City o f Detroit,“ the Sixth 
Circuit reversed dismissal of a claim on standing grounds and 
held that the plaintiffs who passed on alleged overcharges as the 
result of an upstream conspiracy should not be denied standing 
because they passed through the overcharges. In In re Wyoming 
Tight Sands Antitrust Cases,63 the Tenth Circuit denied parens 
patriae standing, in direct conflict with a Seventh Circuit decision
60 For more colorful descriptions of standing doctrine see the 
summary listed in Fletcher, supra note 55, at 221.
61 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
62 866 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 3236 (1990). -
63 866 F.2d 1286 (10th Cir. 1989), aff’d, sub nom., Kansas & 
Missouri v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2807 (1990).
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upholding standing in similar circumstances. Standing was 
denied64 to states suing on behalf of consumers allegedly the 
victims of a price-fixing conspiracy in the natural gas business 
even though the enhanced prices had been directly passed on to 
the state's consumers. The Tenth Circuit did so because it read 
Hanover Shoe65 as requiring a preexisting cost plus contract in 
order to invoke the pass-through exception to the Illinois Brick 
rule barring indirect purchasers from maintaining an antitrust 
suit.
The Supreme Court affirmed66 the Tenth Circuit's overly 
technical and narrow reading of the pass-through exception to 
Illinois Brick. The Supreme Court speculated that the utility 
passing on the overcharge may be injured independently of an 
injury to its customers and that timing problems caused by state 
rate regulation might raise complex issues of apportionment of 
the amount passed on.67 The majority further speculated that
64 State v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 852 F.2d 891 (7th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 109 S. Ct. 543 (1988).
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 
481 (1968).
66 Kansas & Missouri v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2807 
(1990).
The Court's hypothetical can easily be changed to support the 
opposite result of permitting a recovery. More likely than not, over­
charges for gas sold to the utilities for resale to consumers would have 
been included in utility rates as- a recoverable expense for which 
consumers must pay. Regulatory lag in discovering the inflated charges 
for gas would mean the utilities would retain earnings reflecting the 
overcharge for a substantial time. In addition to the possibility of 
utilities keeping the float for overcharges because of regulatory lag, 
the "filed rate" doctrine might preclude a retroactive recovery of all of 
the excessive charges for a basic cost input to a utility like gas purchase 
costs. Ratemaking is generally said to be prospective. Past errors in rates 
may not generally be recovered in future rates. At the federal level, the 
filed rate doctrine precludes a regulated entity from charging rates other 
than those on file with the regulatory commission and has been held to
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there remained a risk of double recoveries due to the complexity 
of apportioning the damages between the utility and its cus­
tomers, even though the Court had held that state courts acting 
under state antitrust laws were free to adopt a policy of permit­
ting indirect purchaser suits in California v. Arc America Corp.** 
State courts are apparently considered capable of sorting out the 
complexities of indirect purchaser suits while federal courts are 
not. ,
The twisting and turning of the federal courts on the right of 
indirect purchasers to maintain a damage action is an example of 
the undue confusion generated by both antitrust standing doc­
trine, other judicially created limitations on the right to maintain 
damage actions like the Illinois Brick decision and the detach­
ment of antitrust rules from the underlying purposes of the law. 
It also bespeaks of a judicial hostility to private antitrust enforce­
ment by the creation of abstract and hypothetical complications 
to avoid giving effect to the congressional grant of a right to 
“any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
preclude a court or regulatory commission from altering a rate retro­
actively. The doctrine is said to be based on the need to preserve the 
stability of rates and protect the primary jurisdiction over ratemaking in 
the regulatory commission. See, Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 
453 U.S. 571,101 S. Ct. 2925, 69 L. Ed. 2d 856 (1981); Square D Co. v. 
Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Ihc., 476 U.S. 409, 106 S. Ct. 1922, 90 
L. Ed. 2d 413 (1986); L. Schwartz, J. Flynn & H. First, Free 
Enterprise & Economic Organization: Government Regulation 355­
57 (1985). The same day the Court decided the Kansas case, it decided a 
case where the filed rate doctrine was invoked to strike down a 
negotiated rate by truckers lower than the filed rate with the ICC. See, 
Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2750
(1990). Consequently, if the utility is the only party able to recover for 
the overcharge, it is likely that the utility will be able to retain the 
overcharge and consumers would not recover anything for the higher 
prices they paid and state regulatory policy would preclude a regulatory 
commission from recouping the overcharge for consumers by retro­
active ratemaking.
«  109 S. Ct. 1661 (1989).
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reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws"69 to bring a 
private damage action. It is also a warning to any antitrust 
plaintiff to hire a specialist in geometry or metaphysics before 
filing a treble damage action where potential standing or Illinois 
Brick problems may be lurking in the vicinity.
Standing type confusion has not stopped there. The states 
have stepped into the Illinois Brick controversy by passing state 
laws permitting indirect purchaser suits in some circumstances for 
a violation of their own state antitrust laws. In California v. ARC 
America Corp,™ the Ninth Circuit held that state antitrust law 
provisions permitting suits by indirect purchasers found in the 
Alabama, California and Minnesota antitrust laws are preempted 
by federal antitrust policy because they stand “as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of federal 
antitrust law.” The Supreme Court granted certiorari and the 
Solicitor General—surprisingly—came into the case on the side of 
the states. In a unanimous opinion, the Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit and held that federal law does not preempt state antitrust 
laws from granting indirect purchasers the right to maintain a 
state antitrust suit seeking damages for injuries they may claim.71 
Now, rather than confronting the complexity of sorting out 
damage proofs in a single federal action, defendants will be 
confronted with doing so in an array of state cases involving 
varying state laws authorizing indirect purchaser suits under state 
antitrust laws.
An analogous line of standing type cases has been evolving in 
the merger field as a result of the Supreme Court's standing 
decision in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort o f C o lo ra d o In Cargill, the 
Court required a plaintiff competitor seeking to enjoin a merger 
to prove an injury of the type the antitrust laws were designed to
69 Clayton Act § 4, IS U.S.C § IS (emphasis added).
to 1987-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,575 (9th Cir. 1987).
71 California v. Arc America, 109 S. Ct. 1661 (1989).
»  479 U.S. 104 (1986).
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prevent. While rejecting an amicus argument by the Justice 
Department arguing that competitor suits to enjoin a merger 
should be denied standing as a matter of course because of the 
danger that the suit would be used to curb competition rather 
than foster it, the Court's opinion left confused and confusing 
just what a private plaintiff must prove to maintain a private 
action challenging a section 7 violation. The Court held that a 
private antitrust plaintiff seeking standing to maintain an injunc­
tion action is required to show threatened loss from an antitrust 
violation as opposed to loss due “merely to an increase in 
competition."
Where the injunction sought is a preliminary injunction, the 
issue becomes even more complex since the plaintiff is faced with 
having to prove a form of double incipiency—that the plaintiff is 
likely to prevail on the merits where the merits require a showing 
of a threatened—rather than actual—loss of competition or 
tendency to a monopoly. Treating the issue as a standing issue 
rather than a duty, damage or causation issue, once again forces 
a plaintiff to prove a case in chief at the preliminary stages of the 
litigation in order to be able to go on to prove the case in chief—a 
substantial barrier to private actions for injunctive relief and a 
result that significantly alters the express language of section 16 
of the Clayton Act.73
Some lower courts have read Cargill as denying competitors 
standing to bring injunctive actions to enforce section 7 of the 
Clayton Act in just about any circumstances imaginable. For 
example, in Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co.1* the Fifth 
Circuit held that a competitor challenging a merger resulting in a
73 Section 16 provides that any person “shall be entitled to sue" for 
injunctive relief for “threatened loss ojr damage. . . . "  Requiring 
proof of actual loss or damage is inconsistent with this express language. 
Any fear of a misuse of the right to seek a private injunction for 
anticompetitive purposes should be more than remedied by the costs of 
filing such suits in the first place and the express requirement for posting 
a bond to cover the costs of an improvidently granted injunction.
7« 842 F.2d 95 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988).
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66%-85% market share in the wholesale photo-finishing market 
lacked standing to challenge the merger. In the course of effec­
tively repealing section 16 of the Clayton Act, the court held that 
a competitor lacked standing to challenge a merger creating a 
monopolist as a result of the Supreme Court's Monfort decision. 
The Phototron court's standing holding appears to result in 
barring a private plaintiff from maintaining a suit where the 
merger results in a potential violation of section 2 of the Sherman 
Act and a clear violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.
The Second Circuit parted company from the Fifth in the 
recent case of R.C. Bigelow v. Unilever N. V.,75 a private suit 
challenging a merger that would have resulted in a single firm 
with 84% of the herbal tea market. Bigelow involved a merger 
that the FTC had studied for 6 months without action or an 
explanation for its nonaction. The Second Circuit upheld the 
plaintiffs standing, finding that an 84% market share not only 
justified a finding that the merger created a monopoly, but that it 
also raised a presumption of antitrust injury for purposes of a 
private injunction action under sections 7 and 16 of the Clayton 
Act. The Bigelow case raises another conflict in the circuits over 
antitrust standing and one demanding clarification of the doc­
trine by either the Court or Congress.
Cargill, Illinois Brick, Associated Contractors and their prog­
eny, have generated an even more confused standing, injury and 
causation type of controversy in the context of a vertical price- 
fixing case. In USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,76 a 
panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed dismissal on standing grounds 
of a competitor's claim that the defendant oil company had 
engaged in a conspiracy to set maximum prices with the purpose 
and effect of injuring the plaintiff independent gasoline mar­
keter. The trial court held the plaintiff had no standing to 
complain without a showing that the maximum price fixed was a
75 56 A ntitrust & T rade Reg. Rep . (BNA) 160 (2d Cir. 1989).
76 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 168,255 (9th Cir. 1988). Contra, Jack 
Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Building, Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 
1984).
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predatory price—since by definition the plaintiff could not claim 
that it suffered the type of injury the antitrust laws prohibit 
absent proof of below-cost pricing; the plaintiff's injury was 
caused by “competition" not the displacement of it. The court of 
appeals rejected the simplistic cliche that the antitrust laws were 
enacted to protect competition, not competitors—how can you 
have competition without competitors—and held that the plain­
tiff , was entitled ta  its day in court to determine whether it 
suffered antitrust damage. In effect, the court held that the 
plaintiff, should not be thrown out of court at the preliminary 
stage of the litigation by a combination of cliches and economic 
theorizing inconsistent with the congressionally defined goals of 
antitrust policy and the procedural demands of a sensible litiga­
tion process.
On its face the complaint presented a clear claim that the law 
was violated, despite what some may think about the per se 
prohibition of maximum price fixing. Whether the alleged viola­
tion caused damages to the plaintiff and whether they were 
measurable damages were issues that could not be determined on 
a paper motion at preliminary stages of the litigation and must 
await further discovery and trial on the merits.
The Supreme Court reversed,77 and held:
Antitrust injury does not arise for purposes of § 4 of the Clayton Act 
. . .  until a private party is adversely affected by an anticompetitive 
aspect of the defendant's Conduct; . . .  in the context of pricing 
practices, only predatory pricing has the requisite anticompetitive 
effect. . . .  Low prices benefit consumers regardless of how those 
prices are set, and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do 
not threaten competition. Hence, they cannot.jive rise to antitrust 
injury.7*
The majority went on to observe that the “antitrust injury 
requirement ensures that a plaintiff can recover only; if the loss 
stems from an competition-reducmg aspect or effect of a defen­
77 Atlantic Richfield Corp. v. USA Petroleum Co., L10 S. Ct. 1884
(1990).
78 110 S. Ct. at 1892 (emphasis m original). ,
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dant’s behavior.” 79 Since the conduct involved a vertical maxi­
mum price-fixing agreement reducing prices, the Court held the 
conduct was not a “competition-reducing” form of behavior 
because consumers were benefited and not harmed by the prac­
tice.
The opinion further complicates a treble damage plaintiffs 
ability to bring a damage action since it is not clear whether the 
majority is changing the meaning of what it is that violates the 
law, holding that “causation” is not present, or defining as a 
matter of law what will constitute “injury” for purposes of 
section 4. Implicitly, the majority opinion appears to be suggest­
ing that the only purpose of antitrust policy is the protection of 
“consumer welfare” as that concept is defined by neoclassical 
economic theory. A vertical maximum price-fixing agreement 
lowering prices to consumers “benefits” consumers under this 
line of thinking since the only purpose of antitrust policy is to 
insure the lowest possible price absent predatory pricing—which 
cannot happen or last long under the artificial assumptions of the 
model. Consequently, the opinion can be read as saying that 
nonpredatory vertical maximum price fixing is not a violation of 
the law, per se or otherwise, since by definition consumers are not 
injured by a reduction in price. Implicitly, and despite claims to 
the contrary in the majority opinion, the decision overrules the 
Albrecht decision10 except where a maximum price-fixing conspir­
acy raises prices. If, of course, one takes the views that the goals 
of antitrust policy are broader than the neoclassical concept of 
“consumer welfare,” that courts should take account of facts 
unique to the industry involved in the dispute before the court 
and that the law is designed to protect competition as a process 
rather than an abstract two-dimensional ideal based upon theo­
retical assumptions which seldom exist in reality,8' the conduct 
could well be found to violate the law.*2
79 110 S. Ct. at 1894 (emphasis in original).
«> Albrecht v. The| Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145(1968).
81 The most succinct and accurate summary of the goals of antitrust 
policy mandated by Congress and enforced by the courts until recently,
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Or the majority opinion can be read as saying that competitors 
have no standing to complain about a vertical maximum price- 
fixing conspiracy because the antitrust laws only protect con­
sumers and not competitors. If this is the holding of the majority, 
then it is difficult to see who might maintain a suit since—in the 
absence of below cost predatory pricing—a vertical maximum 
price-fixing conspiracy setting prices below that which would 
pertain in the absence of the conspiracy, would benefit consumers 
(at least “benefit" under the assumptions of the model if not the 
law and in reality) and not harm them. Consequently, consumers 
could n6t maintain a suit since they are not injured.
A government suit, logically, should meet the same fate, if 
“consumer welfare" is the sole 'goal of antitrust policy. And, 
despite statements in the opinion to the contrary, it would appear 
that the logical upshot of the opinion is to reduce the per se status 
of vertical maximum price fixing where the maximum price is a 
nonpredatory reduction in price to a violation that no one could 
sue to redress since there would by definition be no antitrust 
injury. Indeed, the opinion might even be read as wiping out 
competitor suits generally unless it is first shown that the practice
neoclassical theory notwithstanding, is that suggested by Professor 
Eleanor Fox: “There are four major historical goals of antitrust, and all 
should continue to be respected. These are: (1) dispersion of economic 
power, (2) freedom and opportunity to compete on the merits, (3) 
satisfaction of consumers, and (4) protection of the competition process 
as market governor." Fox, The Modernization o f Antitrust: A New 
Equilibrium, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1140, 1154 (1981). See alsot Flynn, 
The Misuse o f Economic Analysis in Antitrust Litigation, 12 Sw. U.L. 
Rev. 335 (1980); Flynn, supra note 18.
These are political goads, values, and “ought" propositions. They 
call for tools of analysis capable of implementing a more subtle concept 
of competition, competition as a process, rather than the mechanically 
measured quantitative concept advocated by neoclassical theorists. It is 
clear that Congress intended to regulate commerce and to prohibit 
private commercial practices that interfered with the competitive proc­
ess, regardless of the wealth-enhancing quality of those practices. See, 
Flynn & Ponsoldt, supra note 57.
82 See, Flynn & Ponsoldt, supra note 57.
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in question raised prices to consumers. Then, of course, it will be 
argued that competitor suits are really derivative of consumer 
rights and are “indirect" actions that must be dismissed since 
they violate the policy of Illinois Brick by generating too much 
complexity for federal courts to handle.
The majority opinion may also be read as an interpretation of 
the causation requirement or of the injury requirement for 
maintaining a treble damage action. If read as a “causation" 
decision, one elaborating on the euphemistic requirement that for 
an injury to be an “antitrust injury" it must be one that “ flows 
from" an antitrust violation, the opinion raises the endless 
metaphysical debates surrounding causation that can be spun out 
of the Brunswick83 and Cargill84 decisions and their progeny. 
And, if the opinion be viewed as an interpretation of the 
“injury” requirement, it generates great confusion over the scope 
of the function of a jury Xjb determine both the fact and amount 
of damage only after a full trial, rather than by judicial specula­
tion in the preliminary stages of litigation.
If private antitrust litigation is to play an important role in the 
future, this growing morass of standing decisions and the confu­
sion between (1) what duties the antitrust laws create and what 
evidence is necessary to show a breach, (2) what evidence is 
sufficient tp show a factual connection between the breach and 
injury to the plaintiff, and (3) what evidence is sufficient to prove 
injury, are in need of a substantial overhaul. These issues are also 
in need of considerable clarification in view of the significant 
issue of how they relate to who is constitutionally required or 
entitled to decide which question—on what standards and at what 
point in a trial—judge or jury. It is an area to which the private 
bar, the administration and Congress should all address their 
attention and find a solution to what has become a most signifi­
cant barrier to private antitrust enforcement—the mythology
83 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,489 
(1977) (damage claimant in a § 7 merger case must show the "injury is 
casually linked to an illegal presence in the market”).
84 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, 479 U.S, 104 (1986).
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of standing to sue and the procedural and substantive morass it
has created. . .
Antitrust policy also would benefit by preventing the under­
mining of antitrust policy by substantive decisions made about 
the scope of duties created by the antitrust laws, causation issues 
and the meaning of and method for proof of damages-behind the 
mask of standing, indirect injury and injury. Like the doctrines 
of proximate cause in torts and privity in contracts, the doctrine 
of standing should be relegated to the attic of legal history—there 
to gather dust as one of the curiosities of the past designed to 
provide certainty while only generating massive confusion and 
depriving litigants of their appropriate day in court on the merits 
of their claims.83 If the doctrine of antitrust standing is not 
reigned in, then the future of!private antitrust enforcement is 
indeed bleak.
B. The role o f summary judgment
Another predictable variable of great significance to the 
future of private antitrust enforcement is the substantial change 
in the role of summary judgment in antitrust litigation and the 
startling decision of Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp.* In Matsushita the Supreme Court held that 
the Third Circuit did not apply the proper standard in reversing a 
trial court’s grant of summary judgment in a private suit alleging 
that several Japanese consumer electronics manufacturers had 
engaged in a predatory pricing scheme. The plaintiffs claimed the 
defendants had conspired to drive them from the market by a 
longstanding conspiracy to keep prices high in Japan and low in 
the United States—prices often so low that they were 20%-25% 
below cost.87 Ever vigilant for protecting the geometric symmetry
85 See generally, Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Func­
tional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. (1935). \
m 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
87 See, Sussman, Business Judgment vs. Antitrust Justice, 76 Geo. 
L.J. 337, 341 (1987).
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of neoclassical price theory even at the expense of the facts of 
actual cases, the Antitrust Division filed an amicus brief on the 
side of the defendants relying on an earlier law review article 
commenting on the case by a newly appointed federal judge who 
did not try the case, revievy the record or hear the appeal."
The Court's opinion upholding the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment did several things of great significance for 
private antitrust litigation:
p <•
1. It substantially changed the standard by which summary judgment 
motions are to be weighed thereby altering the traditional test and 
the balance between a court's law making and a jury's fact finding 
functions in private antitrust litigation;
2. It looked only at the defendant's theory of the case to determine 
whether the plaintiff stated a claim, thereby making the defendant's 
“plausible" theoretical explanation of its conduct the test for 
summary judgment rather than the plausibility of plaintiff's facts 
and allegations of a violation of its rights the test for whether the 
motion should be granted;
3. It appeared to buy hook, line and sinker the application of abstract 
neoclassical price theory to judge the validity of an antitrust claim 
despite alternative economic and other frameworks for understand­
ing the facts of the dispute and Congressional policy to the con­
trary;*9
\ .
4. It ignored or tried to explain away the facts of the dispute and the 
plaintiff's interpretation of them in reaching its decision; and
88 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
106 S. Ct. 1348, 13S9 n.10 (1986), citing the “sensible assessment" of 
Easterbrook, The Limits o f Antitrust, 63 Texas L. Rev. 1 (1984). For a 
“sensible assessment" of the Court's majority opinion, see, Flynn, 
supra note 16.
89 For a persuasive examination of the facts—as opposed to 
abstract theory detached from the reality of the dispute before the 
court—explaining what was occurring in the case, see Note, Below Cost 
Sales and the Buying o f Market Share, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 695 (1990).
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5. It tipped the balance in judging summary judgment motions decid­
edly against—rather than in favor of—the. party moved against.90
If the majority was seeking to straighten out the standards to 
govern summary judgment motions in antitrust cases, the opinion 
is a classic demonstration of G.K. Chesterton’s cynical observa­
tion: “If a thing is worth doing, it is worth doing badly.”
Perhaps the most significant parts of the Court’s decision are 
those establishing a new standard for summary judgment motions 
and the implicit adoption of static neoclassical price theory as the 
sole guide to antitrust policy and the standard to be used for 
summary judgment motions in antitrust cases. Any attorney 
involved in private litigation will have no doubt encountered the 
new summary judgment standard in just about every case they 
bring or defend: “ [I]f the factual context renders respondent's 
claim implausible—if the claim is one that simply makes no 
economic sense—respondents must come forward with more 
persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise 
be necessary.” 91
“Economic sense” is apparently to be determined by neoclas­
sical price theory and the defendant's version of it to determine 
whether the plaintiffs' case makes “economic sense.” Since 
neoclassical price theory dictates that predatory pricing is seldom 
tried and rarely successful, reality to the contrary notwithstand­
ing,92 the Court's opinion requires a “respondent to a motion for
90 See, Flynn, supra note 16; Ponsoldt & Lewyn, Judicial Activism, 
Economic Theory and the Role of Summary Judgment in Sherman Act 
Conspiracy Cases: The Ulogic of Matsushita, 33 A ntitrust Bull. 575
(1988). ’
91 106 S. Ct. at 1357.
92 One study of the data compiled by the Georgetown study of 
private antitrust litigation, P rivate A ntitrust L itigation: New Evi­
dence, New L earning (L . White ed. 1988), suggests that 20% of all 
private cases with a settlement rate of over 90% were predatory pricing
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summary judgment in an antitrust case to show that the predic­
tions of The Model do not follow from the assumptions of The 
Model."93 While tautologies may serve academics in the course of 
befuddling their students, they scarcely serve legal reasoning and 
the fair resolution of lawsuits in accord with the underlying 
purposes of the law and the practical requirements of a sensible 
procedural system. With all due respect, the majority opinion's 
method of analysis is logically absurd, inconsistent with the 
historical purposes of the. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an 
impingement upon the constitutional right to jury trial, contrary 
to the goals of antitrust policy, and potentially devastating to all 
private antitrust litigation if it is to be rigidly followed in the 
future. ,
In recent years, summary judgment motions are granted in 
whole or in part in over 50% of private antitrust cases; a factor 
contributing heavily to the 47% decrease in private suits in the 
past 10 years.9* The widespread and growing use of summary 
judgment in private antitrust suits is testimony to either the
cases. See, Forward: The Cases, the Judges, and Economic Research in 
U.S. Antitrust Policyt 13 Wage-P rice L. & E con. Rev. 1, 17 (1989).
In Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, 479 U.S. 104, 121 (1986), 
the Court observed: "While firms may engage in the practice [predatory 
pricing] only infrequently, there is ample evidence that the practice does 
occur." In this author's experience, predatory pricing does occur with 
more frequency than is generally believed or an abstract economic 
theory based on a world of perfect competition and rational maximiza­
tion would suggest. The problem is one of proving the conduct has 
taken place. Determining cost information and the standard by which 
pricing is to be deemed "predatory" are often insuperable barriers to 
bringing a suit on this basis. Where a case is brought the battle can be 
long, complex and expensive. See, e.g., Inglis Wins $13.3 Million 
Judgment in 17-Year-Old Predatory Pricing Case, 56 A ntitrust & 
T rade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 369 (March 9, 1989). The problem becomes 
impossible where courts begin with an assumption the practice simply 
could not happen and, after Matsushita, utilize that assumption to 
measure a plaintiffs case on a motion for summary judgment.
93 Flynn, supra note 16.
9* 55 A ntitrust & T rade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 797 (Nov. 3, 1988).
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baseless nature of many such suits, to the growing use of 
summary judgment motions by trial judges to cut off lawsuits 
they do not like or to the increasing influence of ideology to 
resolve lawsuits detached from the reality of the lawsuit and the 
congressionally mandated goals of the law. While some of this 
increased use of summary judgment is no doubt due to baseless 
or poorly pleaded lawsuits, my review of the cases over the past
10 years suggests that a far greater share of it is attributable to 
judges getting rid of lawsuits they do not like or cases they 
mistakenly believe will consume too much time on a busy docket 
and increased reliance on the ideology of neoclassical theorizing 
dictating what the law ought to be rather than the policies of 
Congress and the facts of cases determining what the law ought 
to be. I
Those cases that are baseless lawsuits can be readily dealt with 
by the use of rule 11 sanctions, rather than distorting the 
standards for summary judgment to deal with the imagined 
problem of countless baseless lawsuits filed by dishonest or 
incompetent lawyers or competitors seeking to misuse the anti­
trust laws. Matsushita's standard for determining whether sum­
mary judgment should be granted can only accelerate the trend 
demonstrated by the standing and Illinois Brick doctrines of 
prematurely deciding antitrust cases on the pleadings and before 
trial. Matsushita establishes a bad process for legal decision 
making whatever one might think of private litigation to enforce 
antitrust policy. Moreover, as the important Georgetown study of 
private antitrust litigation shows* it is an unnecessary trend if one 
views the issue solely from the perspective of the light burden 
private antitrust litigation imposes on the courts.93
Procedural issues to one side, the substantive standards for 
weighing predatory pricing cases announced by Matsushita, that 
predatory pricing is seldom tried and rarely successful as deter­
mined by neoclassical theorizing, has come under increased scru-
95 P rivate A ntitrust L itigation: New E vidence, New Learning, 
supra note 92, at 8-10.
922 : The antitrust bulletin
tiny and attack. For example, Oliver Williamson has argued that 
the neoclassical approach paints too simplistic a picture of preda­
tory pricing and that the enforcement agencies and the courts 
should also evaluate the practice from the newly emerging eco­
nomic perspective of offensive strategic behavior—or conduct 
aimed at actual or potential competitors to discipline or otherwise 
deter competitive behavior.96 Although Williamson expressed res­
ervations about the plaintiff’s theory of the case in Matsushita, in 
part because of an economist’s grave reservations about the 
efficacy of conspiracy doctrine, he found that the dissenting 
opinion in Matsushita adheres more closely to the standards that 
ought to be followed in summary judgment cases—a conclusion 
supported by an extensive study of the record in the case.97
In other words, the majority overturned decades of summary 
judgment law and cut off a full and fair analysis of the plaintiffs 
theory of the case and the record facts, a theory based on 
economic insights suggesting that a 15-year predatory pricing 
campaign by Japanese firms may well have been for strategic 
anticompetitive purposes. The Court did so because the ma­
96 Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 Geo. L.J. 271 (1987). See 
also, Krattenmaker, Lande & Salop, Monopoly Power and Market 
Power in Antitrust Law, 76 Geo. L.J. 241 (1987). Among the difficul­
ties critics of the neoclassical school of economic thought have had in 
arguing for alternative analytical methods for assessing conduct claimed 
to violate antitrust policy is the penchant lawyers and judges pretending 
to be economists have for models to define legal rules and dictate what 
the facts of specific cases are and mean. Such an approach to the legal 
analysis of disputes is a long discredited method of analytical positi­
vism. See Flynn, Legal Reasoning, Antitrust Polity and the Social 
“Science” o f Economics, 33 A ntitrust Bull 713 (1988). Unfortunately, 
the methodology has become attractive to judges and requires critics of 
the current state of antitrust analysis to come up with alternative 
models, one hopes empirically based rather than abstract models, 
providing a scientific analytical framework for decision making that will 
always produce the right answer and eliminate discretion in decision 
making. Unfortunately, several hundred years of legal decision making 
have proven such a standard of certainty to be, an illusion, and a 
dangerous one at that.
97 Ponsoldt & Lewyn, supra note 90. /
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jority's view of the case and the realities, of predatory pricing 
practices were captured by a belief in the religion of static 
neoclassical price theory—proof of Stendhal's observation "that 
“all religions are founded on the fear of the many and the 
cleverness of the few.”
Some lower courts, not overwhelmed by the superficial logic 
of the model and a temptation to clear their docket of cases by a 
freewheeling use of summary judgment and Matsushita’s invita­
tion to do so, have found grounds for believing that predatory 
pricing is more often attempted, can be successful and requires a 
trial of the facts underlying predatory pricing claims where, they 
are alleged—“economic” plausibility to the contrary notwith­
standing. In McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co.,98 the 11th 
Circuit reversed dismissal of a Sherman Act and Robinson- 
Patman Act claim of predatory pricing despite Matsushita. The 
court noted that the Areeda-Tumer test for predatory pricing, 
drawing the line of illegality at average variable cost,99 “is like the 
Venus DeMilo: it is much admired and often discussed, but rarely 
embraced.” In conflict with decisions from other circuits and the 
abstract theoretical test for summary judgment the majority 
adopted in Matsushita, the court held: “when an antitrust defen­
dant moves for judgement as a matter of law, the test for 
predatory pricing must consider subjective evidence and should 
use average total cost as the cost above which no inference of 
predatory intent can be made.”
The McGahee case was a well prepared appeal; one pursued 
by lawyers intimately familiar with economic theorizing and the 
goals of antitrust policy. It is also a case decided by a judge 
concerned about the facts of the dispute before him; facts 
carefully and fully documented by the plaintiff's attorneys. It 
points up the importance of a private plaintiff's attorneys being 
fully conversant with the economic theory relevant and not
m 858 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 109 S. Ct. 2110
(1989).
99 Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under 
Section 2 o f the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975).
. o
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relevanHo the dispute and presenting their case in a compelling 
fashion. Great care should be taken by a plaintiffs attorneys 
before filing a case—care to think out carefully the theory of 
their case, to retain competent and thoughtful economic advice 
and to be prepared to confront judges who may place a heavy 
burden on a plaintiff to sustain his or her case at the preliminary 
stages of the litigation. Until the narrow and closed-minded 
ideological approach of Matsushita, is overcome or ignored how­
ever, careful drafting of a well thought out complaint in much 
greater detail than normally requirejd and with the assistance of 
an economist—not a lawyer pretending to be an economist—is 
the only hope for overcoming what is a bad and unwise Supreme 
Court standard for summary judgment motions in the antitrust 
field and a significant nail in the coffin of the future of private 
antitrust enforcement.
C. Vertical market restraints and the meaning o f per se and the
rule o f reason |
A final and significant variable that private antitrust enforce­
ment must confront is the gradual destruction of private treble 
damage actions in the area of vertical restraints and the erosion 
of the distinction between per se rules and the rule of reason. In 
the past, a large percentage of private cases involved vertical 
market restraints, an area that neoclassical ideology suggests 
should be of little or no antitrust concern. Twenty years ago the 
Schwinn decision's rigid per se rule prohibiting any restraint on 
alienation after title had passed made vertical market restraints of 
great antitrust concern.100 The private bar responded by attempt-^  
ing to overregulate vertical marketing restraints through a legion 
of private treble damage actions challenging many aspects of 
vertical marketing relationships and doing so pursuant to a 
wooden application of a rule of per se illegality. In response to 
these developments, the Sylvania decision101 put a considerable
100 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
101 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 
(1977).
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damper on the use of private antitrust suits to regulate anything 
other than vertical price fixing.
Elsewhere, I have written extensively about vertical restraints 
suggesting that the appropriate standard by which they should be 
governed lay somewhere between the two extremes of the legal 
formalism of Schwinn and the unrealistic ideological theorizing 
of neoclassical thought relied upon in part by the Sylvania Court 
to overturn Schwinn. I have been suggesting for the past 10 years 
that the per se rules in antitrust ought to be viewed as evidentiary 
presumptions of varying levels of rebutability,103 in part to avoid 
the rigidity of the two extremes represented by Schwinn and by 
the neoclassical approach—extremes incapable of taking account 
of the facts unique to individual cases and all the policies 
underlying the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court, however, 
seems to be drifting further and further in the direction of relying 
upon a rigid version of neoclassical thought with its simplistic 
assumption that all vertical restraints save those masking a cartel 
or designed by a firm with monopoly power to exclude competi­
tion should be considered per se lawful. The irony that the 
rigidities of both the Schwinn and neoclassical approaches suffer 
from the same analytical faults, a failure to capture fully the 
values underlying antitrust policy and an inability to take account 
of facts unique to individual cases, seems to have escaped the 
Court.
A good illustration of the wisdom of treating per se rules as 
evidentiary presumptions subject to well defined defenses and 
justifications is demonstrated by the confused and confusing state 
of the tying doctrine in antitrust. In the not too distant past, tying 
arrangements were treated harshly by the courts—a seemingly 
absolute rule of per se illegality governed conduct once it was
tea See Flynn, supra note 17, at 1095.
103 See Flynn, A n titru st L.J., supra note 57. The suggestion has 
subsequently been proposed by others. See, 7 P. Areeda, A n titrust 
Law, chap. 15 (1986).
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defined as “tying" after cases like Northern Pacific104 and Inter­
national Salt.™ There is reason for treating tying arrangements 
with suspicion, because Congress has singled out tying arrange­
ments for special treatment under an incipiency standard in 
section 3 of the Clayton Act106 and tying can impinge upon 
fundamental values underlying the Sherman Act if the congres­
sional goals of that Act are respected by the courts. Sorting out 
those tying arrangements that impinge on antitrust goals from 
those that do not can be a challenge from one unique factual 
circumstance to another. The analytical method for doing so is, 
therefore, crucial to the development of a predictable tying 
doctrine—one that sensibly handles the facts of cases, respects 
the goals for antitrust established by Congress and provides a 
knowable and predictable standard for those subject to the law.
A rigid per se approach is incapable of doing these things 
where it subsumes all the issues to be determined under the initial 
analysis of whether a particular transaction is or is not a tying 
arrangement.107 The per se approach traditionally followed in 
tying cases reached new heights of legal formalism in the first 
Fortner decision categorizing a financing arrangement for goods 
as a tying arrangement and suggesting it was per se unlawful if 
there is “power" in the tying product market.10* On a second 
appeal of the same case, much backing and filling was required to 
explain why the particular financing arrangement was not an
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
105 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
>06 15 U.S.C. § 15.
wn Bauer, A Simplified Approach to Tying Arrangements: A Legal 
and Economic Analysis, 33 Vand. L . Rev. 283, 284 (1980): “Notwith­
standing . . . extensive Supreme Court attention, there is as much heat 
as light in this area. The doctrine which has developed is often 
unpredictable and frequently irrational, and the applicable rules make 
the analysis far more complicated than necessary. A simpler and more 
direct approach is long overdue."
108 Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S.
495 (1969);
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illegal tying arrangement109—an inference left by the first Fortner 
decision. Although the two decisions generated considerable con­
- fusion, is was thereafter widely believed that tying arrangements 
remained per se illegal where there were two separate products 
and “power" was shown in the tying product market. For tying 
cases, the translation of the Latin phrase “per se" must be 
, amended from “in itself" to “in itself along with a few other 
mushy things."
In 1984, the Supreme Court once again stepped into what had 
become a growing morass of tying cases in the lower federal 
courts, and added to the morass, in Jefferson Parish Hospital v. 
Hyde."0 In that case, the Court recognized tying arrangements 
were per se illegal, but only where it was shown that there were 
two separate products and there was power in the tying product. 
The Court then proceeded to hold what was labeled below a 
“tying arrangement," a lawful tying arrangement. The plaintiff, 
an anesthesiologist^ claimed that a hospital had refused certifica­
tion for him to practice in the hospital because it had a contract 
with a group of anesthesiologists to provide all necessary anesthe­
siology services at the hospital. The court of appeals held that the 
arrangement was a tying arrangement because consumers not 
wishing to have surgery “cold turkey" were forced to buy one 
product to get another—the tying product being the hospital 
operating room and the tied product being anesthesiology serv­
ices. The lower court found power in the tying product and a not 
insubstantial amount of commerce involved, and therefore held 
the tie per se illegal.1"
It is fair to suggest that the Supreme Court struggled unsuc­
cessfully with the analysis of both the facets and the law on 
review; attempting to sort out what appeared to the Court at least 
as a square peg—the facts of the case and the reality of the
105 United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 495 U.S. 
610(1977).
466 U.S. 2 (1984).
111 Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982).
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hospital and medical businesses—that did not fit a round hole— 
the per se pigeonhole the record below labeled as the antitrust 
offense of “tying.” Viewed from the defendant hospital and 
plaintiff doctor's point of view, the contract was an exclusive 
dealing arrangement with a competing supplier of the service; 
viewed from the patient's perspective, the arrangement was a per 
se illegal tying arrangement requiring the patient to purchase one 
product in order to have another.
Not surprisingly, the Court's analysis unraveled once the 
confines of the seemingly rigid per se rule of tying analysis 
captured the Court's thinking and method for analyzing the case. 
The opinion wanders back and forth between arguments that 
there were not two separate products to the issue of whether there 
was sufficient power in the tying product market to the issue of 
whether the power that did exist was the “kind" of market power 
necessary to prove the arrangement illegal. Jefferson Parish left 
tying analysis in further disarray, while also leaving the plaintiff 
doctor excluded from providing service in the defendant hospital. 
Patients in the hospital were left with little or no choice in the 
selection of the physician to provide them with anesthesiology 
services.
Think of how much simpler and more clear cut the analysis 
might have been if the Court had simply held that if the 
arrangement was to be labeled a tying arrangement, it was 
presumptively illegal subject to some affirmative defenses'12— 
defenses proving a justification or excuse for the arrangement 
under the circumstances of the case. Instead of the analysis being
ia The level of rebutability should vary from one category of per se 
illegality to another. For example, the presumption of per se illegality 
for horizontal price fixing should be nearly conclusive, although some 
circumstances might justify recognition of a narrow justification or 
excuse, particularly where other regulation is present. See, Broadcast 
Music, Inc. v. C.B.S. System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); F.T.C. v. Indiana 
Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). On the other hand, only a 
moderately presumptive level of illegality would be appropriate in the 
case of tying arrangements. See, Data General Corp. v. Digidyne Corp., 
734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 473 U.S. 409 (1985).
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deflected into arcane epistemological debates over the existence 
of one or two products and metaphysical distinctions between 
various types of market power, the analysis could have addressed 
in a straightforward way whether the displacement of a competi­
tive process in anesthesiology services was justified in the circum- . 
stances unique to the case and by means within those permitted 
by the congressional goals of antitrust policy.
The majority of subsequent tying cases dismissed at some 
early stage of the proceeding, cite one or more of the inconsistent 
holdings one may read into the Jefferson Parish decision. This 
state of affairs may be pleasing to those who believe the tying 
doctrine should be done away with altogether—out of a naive 
belief that tying arrangements simply do not matter despite what 
Congress has said about them, the facts and circumstances of 
individual cases and the underlying goals of antitrust policy tying 
arrangements can impinge in many circumstances. Real judges 
deciding real cases brought by real lawyers and dealing with the 
messy world of real facts however, need something better than 
the rigid but unknowable standards of per se tying doctrine at the 
one extreme and the unrealistic approach of neoclassical theoriz­
ing, unconcerned about the facts and the law, at the other 
extreme.
Some tying cases continue to be brought, particularly in the 
area of intellectual property rights, where claims of tying still 
benefit from a presumption of power in the tying product. For 
example, in Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp.,"3 Chief 
Judge Browning of the Ninth Circuit held that a computer 
manufacturer's refusal to license its popular copyrighted com­
puter operating system unless licensees of the program also 
purchase the computer system from it constituted a per se illegal 
tying arrangement. On petition for certiorari, Justices White and 
Blackmun dissented from the refusal to grant certiorari claiming 
that the decision was inconsistent with whatever the holding was 
in the Jefferson Parish case."4 In another recent case, William
734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984).
114 Data General Corp. v. Digidyne Corp., 473 U.S. 908 (1985).
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Cohen & Sons, Inc. v. All American Hero, Inc.™  a district court 
held that the requirement that trademark licensees for a fast food 
franchise purchase all their beef needs from the franchisor— 
licensor of the trademark—constituted a tying arrangement and 
that the existence of the trademark justified an inference of 
power in the tying product at least for purposes of a motion for 
summary judgment by the defendant to dismiss the case.
Aside from the particular results in these cases, it is apparent 
that the rigidity of the per se concept is creating at least two 
problems: (1) the creation of arcane and confused distinctions to 
mitigate the per se rule in certain cases where business reality 
requires without appearing to do so; and (2) the detachment of 
the legal analysis of the practice from the facts unique to each 
case and the underlying goals of antitrust policy—particularly the 
goal of protecting each person's right to succeed or fail in the 
market as the result of a competitive process."6
An understandable application of per se rules instead of a 
mechanical application of definitions, the avoidance of judicial 
gymnastics to sidestep a fixed rule in specific cases and the
us* 693 F. Supp. 201 (D.N.J. 1988).
\
H6 Professor Eleanor Fox has concisely summarized the unique 
meaning of the competitive process as intended by those who drafted the 
Sherman Act, as distinguished from competition, as follows: “One 
overarching idea has unified these three concerns (distrust of power, 
concern for consumers and commitment to opportunity for entrepre­
neurs): competition as process. The competition process is the preferred 
governor of markets. If the impersonal forces of competition, rather 
than public or private power, determine market behavior and outcomes, 
power is by definition dispersed, opportunities and incentives for firms 
without market power are increased, and the results are acceptable and 
fair. Some measure of productive and allocative efficiency is a byprod­
uct, because competition tends to stimulate lowest-cost production and 
allocate resources more responsively than a visible public or private 
power." Fox, supra note 81, at 1184. See also, Flynn, Rethinking the 
Sherman Act, supra note 57, at 1623-27; Flynn, supra note 15; Flynn, 
supra note 18, at 304-06.
muting of ideological criticism of the rules would all take place if 
the per se rules were understock! as evidentiary and functional 
rules of varying levels of rebutability; an analytical process that 
avoids the tyranny of labels on the one extreme and the tyranny 
of the simple minded and lawless application of an abstract 
economic model not in conformity with the reality of the case and 
the policies of the law on the other. Both public and private 
antitrust enforcement suffer when the standards to be applied 
consist of either rigid definitions detached from modern reality or 
unrealistic conclusions derived from a model of a world that does 
not exist. 1
The most recent decision in the direction of a nonreflective 
application of nepclassical theorizing, and one that both obscures 
the law of conspiracy and the' law of what constitutes vertical 
price fixing for purposes of antitrust analysis, is Business Elec­
tronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp."'' In that case, the 
Supreme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit's reversal of a jury 
verdict for a plaintiff that complained that the defendant cut it 
off as a dealer in calculators at the behest of a competing 
distributor because the plaintiff was consistently cutting retail 
prices. The Supreme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit's ruling that 
for a vertical agreement between a manufacturer and a dealer to 
terminate a second dealer to be found unlawful, the first dealer 
must expressly or impliedly agree to set its prices at “some level," 
though not a specific one. The Court justified its affirmance of 
the reversal for a new trial, however, by holding that the prime 
vice of vertical price fixing is that it can be used to facilitate 
cartelization and no evidence of cartelization was present in the 
case—a conclusion derived from neoclassical price theory rather 
than the goals of antitrust policy. The Court further stated that 
any lesser standard would subject a manufacturer agreeing with a 
dealer to terminate another dealer to treble damage liability with 
no way for the manufacturer to justify its agreement or for a 
court to distinguish vertical price fixing from other vertical
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in 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
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restraints.1" Other language in the opinion, particularly refer­
ences to  the imaginary horseman of the neoclassical theorist’s 
artificial and apocalyptic world of vertical market regulation by 
antitrust enforcement—“ free rider” 119—suggests that if the per se
iis The Court should have held that conduct impinging upon a basic 
goal of antitrust policy, in this case “promoting freedom and opportu­
nity to compete on the merits," warrants a presumption of illegality 
subject to defenses like a good business justification under the circum­
stances of the case. See Flynn, supra note 17, at 1114-15, 1143-47.
U9 The jargon “free rider" is used as a descriptive definition and a 
conclusion, not a functional legal concept, in neoclassical analysis. It is 
a form of reductionism that might suit theoretical speculation within the 
severe limits of its assumptions, but not a useful method for analyzing 
disputes not in conformity with the assumptions of the model or the 
normative ends of the law. Where used as a definition and a conclusion, 
the concept of “free rider" captures one's thinking by hypostatizing 
(thingifying) an abstract assumption—the meaning and scope of the 
property rights of the proponent of the restraint. By doing so, the 
resulting mental picture deflects the analysis from the normative and 
factual issues of concern by assuming the question antitrust analysis is 
required to explore in vertical market, and other restraints analyzed 
under the antitrust laws—the scope of the property rights of the parties 
to the restraint and how the conflict in rights should be resolved. One of 
the underlying legislative objectives of the Sherman Act was to adopt a 
federal law giving federal courts the power to define the scope of private 
property and contract rights in order to guarantee the existence of a 
competitive process governing the determination of those rights. 
Describing distributors who do not follow the demands Of suppliers with 
regard to price and other aspects of their distribution practices as “free 
riders" assumes the question to be asked: What ought to be the scope of 
the supplier's and distributor's contract and property rights in light of 
the goals of antitrust policy and the facts of the case? See, Sklar, The 
Sherman Antitrust Act and the Corporate Reconstruction of American 
Capitalism, 1890-1914, in Corporations and Society: Power and 
Responsibility 65 (W. Samuels & A . Miller 1987).
Consequently, I have never met or seen “free rider," just as I have 
never met or seen “proximate cause" or “privity.” The words are not 
used as concepts in law are used, to both connote the normative values 
underlying the concept and denote its application to the facts of the 
particular dispute, but are used solely to label whatever a distributor
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prohibition on vertical price fixing is not dead, it is severely 
wounded. »
From an economic point of view, the opinion is a strange one 
since it appears to justify the result and deny consumers the 
freedom to buy from discounters in the name of preserving the 
supplier's freedom to market its goods, in circumstances where 
the termination was not the product of the supplier's independent 
decision making.120 The paternalism of suppliers agreeing with 
some distributors to impose restraints on other distributors for 
the best interests of consumers is apparently necessary to protect 
consumers from the scourge of “free riders”—“consumer wel­
fare” Japan style.121
Instead of holding that the manufacture’s conduct was pre­
sumptively unlawful subject to proof of an economically justifi­
able reason within the goals of antitrust policy for the cutoff, the 
Court remanded for a retrial on the question of whether the
docs as taking something it is assumed belongs to a supplier—without 
stating why the legal system ought to assume the right should belong to 
the buyer in the first instance. The “ free rider”  explanation of vertical 
restraints is one of the more blatant misuses of a definition to displace 
the dynamic and functional use of legal concepts as devices for linking 
the underlying normative goals of the law to the facts of a dispute. See,
F. Cohen, E thical Ideals and L egal Rules: A n E ssay in the Founda­
tions of Legal C riticism 3-7 (1959). As such, it is a thingification and a 
definition displacing an empirical and normative analysis that should be 
banned from the legal analysis of vertical restraints and be relegated to 
Von Jehring’s ’“ Heaven” of other meaningless legalisms, there to join 
“ proximate cause,”  “ standing”  and “ privity” — concepts that obstruct, 
rather than advance, the legal analysis of disputes through the use of 
concepts to link facts and policy. See Flynn, Reaganomics and Antitrust 
Enforcement, A Jurisprudential Critique, 1983 Utah L. Rev. 269; 
Flynn, supra note 96.
. 120 See, 55 A ntitrust T rade Re<|j. Rep . (BNA) 803-04 (Nov. 3,1988) 
(Remarks of E . Fox).
121 See, Fallows, supra note 36, 
dominated by cartels and vertical 
sumers pay retail prices approxima 
the United States.
reporting that in domestic markets 
market restrictions, Japanese con- 
tely 70% higher on average than in
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cutoff was for setting prices at “some level.” Confusion will 
reign over whether Business Electronics is a decision about the 
meaning of agreement or conspiracy or a decision about the 
meaning of “price fixing”—epistemological debates similar to 
those in tying doctrine—since the evidence to prove the existence 
of a conspiracy or agreement will often be the same evidence as 
that relied upon to prove the agreement's objective. What lower 
courts will do with this decision remains a muddled question, 
since just about every vertical price-fixing case will be concerned 
with identification of the conduct, the existence of a conspiracy 
or agreement and the meaning of the Court's standard that the 
agreement need not be one to fix a specific price, but that prices 
be fixed at “some level.”
When Business Electronics and Atlantic Richfield are coupled 
with Matsushita, every vertical price-fixing case is a summary 
judgment'candidate since the combination is an invitation to find 
the plaintiff's claim that the defendant was motivated by a desire 
to'fix  prices is economically implausible since the model's 
assumptions will dictate what facts can be “facts” for purposes 
of the model. The dictates of the model presume that rational is 
whatever a supplier does and whatever a supplier does is rational 
save the implementation of a horizontal cartel. Caises will be 
analyzed in a nonexistent world populated by white-hatted 
rational maximizing distributors preoccupied by consumer wel­
fare as a derivative of their own self interest, and black-hatted 
“free riders” laying waste to the range of perfect competition 
populated by ignorant consumers who need to be made to pay for 
services rational maximizers deem they need. ^
The only prohibition left by this clear path of analysis set by 
the Supreme Court is that horizontal price fixing is the only 
conduct of concern under section 1 of the Sherman Act; a 
conclusion that is difficult to defend if the only goal of antitrust 
policy is to protect the rationality and property rights of suppli­
ers. After all, what could be more “rational” for profit maximiz­
ers than to conspire to fix prices?’21 The Business Electronics
122 See, Flynn, supra note 16.
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decision, a decision dissented from by only Justices Stevens and 
White, holds ominous implications for the future litigation of 
vertical price-fixing cases by private plaintiffs and by the enforce­
ment agencies—particularly when coupled with the implications 
of Matsushita and the simplistic use of neoclassical price theory 
taught in too many 2-week law and economics courses for bench 
and bar.
IV. Conclusion .
One could go on at great length with other Supreme Court 
decisions and the decisions of several lower courts and what they 
mean for the future of private antitrust enforcement. There are 
several circuit court decisions which, by their own standard of 
relying on economic ^ analysis to decide the case, do so incorrectly 
from a mainstream economics point of view.123 What this suggests 
for private antitrust enforcement is that the practitioner should 
be well schooled in the various schools of modern economics and 
have the expert assistance of an economist—not a lawyer pretend­
ing to be one as is often the case with too many lawyers and with 
too many judges—before filing an antitrust case of any sigmfir 
cance. Lawyers gearing up for a new round of antitrust’s * Faust­
ian pact with economists,” 1? would do well to include a 
professionally trained economist—preferably one with a legal 
education as well—on their new antitrust team.
The confusion .generated by standing doctrine and the distor­
tion in the use of summary judgment in antitrust cases also must 
be dealt with if private antitrustenforcement is to have a proper
12) See Antitrust in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal: 11 Cases of 
1987, 20 A n titru st L. & Econ. Rev. 21 (1988); Forward: Antitrust 
Economics in the U.S. Circuit Court ofiAppeals 1, 19 A n titrust L. & 
Econ. Rev. 1 (1987); Shepherd, 14 Recent Antitrust Cases and Main­
stream Industrial-Organization Economics Criteria, 19 A n titru st L. & 
Econ. Rev. 35 (1987). 1
124 See Rowe, The Decline ofAntitrust and the Delusions of Models: 
The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 Geo. L.J . 1511 (1984).
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role in developing and implementing antitrust policy. In the early 
life of the Sherman Act, the use in private antitrust cases of 
restrictive commerce standards, high proof of damage require­
ments and extensive reliance on the rule of reason restricted 
access to the courts by private plaintiffs and ushered in a 
multidecade era of minimal private enforcement. The current 
reliance on the “efficiency only" test for proof of a violation, 
standing doctrine and summary judgment standards reversing the 
burden against the party moved against have all contributed to a 
dim future for private antitrust enforcement. If the past is a 
prolog to the future, the minimal use of private enforcement 
during the first six decades of antitrust enforcement is a more 
likely prediction of the future of private enforcement unless steps 
are taken by both the courts and Congress to rectify an imbalance 
now significantly tilted against the private antitrust plaintiff.
Those who believe antitrust enforcement should make a come­
back in the private arena by dealing with reality and seeking to 
carry out the goals Congress has mandated for it, must pay 
greater attention to the overriding issue in antitrust policy 
today—one that has been around for almost 100 years. As Judge 
Bork put it: “What is the point of the law—what are its goals? 
Everything else follows from the answer we give. . . . Only 
when the issue of goals has been settled is it possible to frame a 
coherent body of substantive rules."1” Beneath all the contro­
versy in Congress, academia and the courts over the rules of 
antitrust and the role of private enforcement, be it standing, the 
role of summary judgment or the implications of vertical price 
fbpng, the overriding issue is: what are the goals of antitrust 
policy and what is the role of which theory of economics being 
followed at any one time in history in both defining those goals 
and the implications of the facts of a particular case? Judge Bork 
has argued that the only goal Congress intended for antitrust 
policy is the technical concept of “consumer welfare" or conduct 
that restricts output—output as defined by the restrictive assump­
tions of the neoclassical model.
125 R. Bork, The A n titru st Paradox: A Policy a t  W ar with Itself  
50 (1978).
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Every other serious reviewer of the legislative history of the 
antitrust laws disagrees with Judge Bork’s reading of that history. 
I do as well.126 Those drafting the antitrust laws “were defining 
the limits upon the exercise of private contract and property 
rights in order to insure the integrity of the political process, the 
rights of individuals in their exercise of property and contract 
rights, and the right of competitors to succeed or fail pursuant to 
a competitive process. ' " 27 For a host of economic, political and 
social reasons, antitrust policy in this day and age should con­
tinue to be viewed as having these goals as the central goals of 
antitrust policy.12*
To insure that they are so construed and to restore the vitality 
of private antitrust enforcement in the future, Congress must 
clarify the point of the law. What is antitrust policy for and what 
values is it intended to protect and promote? Congress should 
hold extensive hearings on this question; hearings aimed at 
adopting a preamble to the Sherman Act explaining the goals of
126 Flynn, supra note 18. . "I
127 id. at 303.
128 Obviously, an entire treatise could be written on what the 
appropriate balance between individualism and community in the eco­
nomic sphere should be and how it ought to be expressed through law in 
the late 20th century. Defining that relationship solely in terms of a 
narrow libertarian economic model is a form of myopia that not only 
ignores history and experience, but ignores contemporary reality, politi­
cal and other institutions and the necessary underlying normative beliefs 
that tie a society together. Efficiency in the use of coinmon resources 
must be weighed along with other economic values such as innovation 
and the social and political beliefs that secure the consent of those 
subject to the law. That consent is defined and secured by a common 
commitment to a sense of justice and the institutions that implement 
that common belief. See, J. Rawls, A T heory of J ustice chap. 5 (1971). 
Ignoring these broader constraints upon the choice of rules and norma­
tive goals governing economic rjights and relationships by exclusive 
reliance upon a narrow .utilitarian model divorced from reality and the 
society in which it functions is a prescription for economic, political and 
social disaster.
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antitrust policy.129 It would be a fitting thing to do as antitrust 
policy enters its second century; it is an essential thing to do if 
antitrust enforcement—public and private—is to be of any rele­
vance at all to our next century or whether it is to continue down 
the sorry path toward becoming an irrelevant abstraction, 
wrapped in the theological shroud of a misused economic theory 
and encumbered with meaningless legalisms making it impossible 
to implement.
For those committed to the current fashion of defining anti­
trust policy solely in terms of static neoclassical price theory, one 
can only suggest that they remember Mencken's observation, 
which should be every lawyer’s and every judge’s motto: “Men 
become civilized not in proportion to. their willingness to believe, 
but in proportion to their readiness to doubt.” It is time to bring 
a lawyer’s skepticism to the indiscriminate use of neoclassical 
theorizing dictating the goals of antitrust policy, the reality it is 
being asked to deal with and the methodology by which the goals 
of antitrust are implemented.130 The reality of the litigation
129 A tentative draft bill would look like the following:
Preamble: The purposes of the antitrust laws are: 1. To insure 
the dispersion of economic power in order to protect the legal, 
social and political processes from undue economic power; 2. 
To promote freedom and opportunity to compete on the merits;
3. To foster the satisfaction of consumers and to protect them 
in the exercise of their contract and property rights; and 4. To 
protect the competition process as market governor.
This language is based on a distillation of studies of the legislative 
history of the antitrust laws found in Fox, supra note 81, at 1154; 
Flynn, Rethinking the Sherman Act, supra note 57, at 1623-27; Flynn, 
supra note 15.
130 There continues to be a considerable amount of scholarship 
concerning the historical and contemporary goals of antitrust policy 
rejecting the neoclassical interpretation of that history and the practical 
application of neoclassical theory to contemporary reality. See, 
Brietzke, The Constitutionalization of Antitrust: Jefferson, Madison, 
Hamilton and Thomas C. Arthur, 22 Val. U.L. Rev. 275 (1988); 
Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Wei-
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process demands it and the art o f legal analysis requires the 
restoration o f inductive legal reasoning in lieu o f the discredited 
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